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INTRODUCTION
Green is the new black. Greenpeace declared: “Climate change is in.
Global warming is hip. Pop stars are urging action. It seems not a day
passes without another big business making a green pronouncement.”1 In
the 1990s, increasing public awareness of climate change prompted a consumer movement to address environmental concerns through selective
product purchasing.2 To capitalize on this consumer trend, manufacturers
1. Climate Wash - It’s the All New Greenwash, GREENPEACE (July 27, 2007),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/climatewash-greenwash-270707/.
2. See Thomas C. Downs, “Environmentally Friendly” Product Advertising: Its Future
Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 155, 155 (1992) (“With this heightened environmental consciousness has come a greater recognition of the consumer’s ability
to promote environmental protection through selective product purchasing.”); Paul H. Luehr, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 313 (1992) (“Consumers not only seek products that are safer for the environment, they are also willing to pay a
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created a “green revolution,” a marketing strategy touting the environmental attributes of a product.3 The movement grew rapidly and continues to
expand; since 2006, green advertising has nearly tripled.4 The most current
trend is to describe the carbon attributes of a product, coined a “tsunami” of
green advertising, which reached a new peak with commercials for a “carbon-neutral Super Bowl” and “carbon-neutral Nascar races.”5 While manufacturers continue to advertise using traditional terminology, the focus has
shifted to the carbon neutrality or sustainability of products.
Companies’ product sales support the overall rising popularity of
“green” products. In 2008 alone, consumers spent five hundred billion dollars on “green” products and services and the market is expected to continue expanding.6 Major retailers, such as Target and Home Depot, still report
strong sales in green goods despite the current economic climate and consumer polls indicate that consumers’ commitment to buying environmentally-friendly products has not been altered by the economy.7 For example,
a survey found that sixty-eight percent of consumers would remain faithful
to an environmentally-conscious brand and seven out of ten consumers
would spend more for environmentally-friendly products even in a recession.8 As green advertising has increased companies’ profitability, rampant

premium to acquire those products.”); Big Opportunities Remain for Green Products, NIEL(Mar. 3, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/big-opportunitiesremain-for-green-products/.
3. See Luehr, supra note 2 (discussing how consumer interest in green products created
a “tremendous source of potential revenue” and “increasingly aggressive” marketing strategies); Deborah Majoras, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed.
Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 8 (Jan.
8. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/transcript/opening_
dpmajoras.pdf (“Businesses have taken notice, and in the past year there’s been a virtual
explosion of green marketing.”).
4. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, at 4 (2009) [hereinafter
TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009], available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/
findings/greenwashing-report-2009/.
5. Jesse Ellison, Save the Planet, Lose the Guilt, NEWSWEEK, June 28, 2008, available
at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/06/28/save-the-planet-lose-the-guilt.html.
6. Consumer Spending on Green Will Double, Reach $500 Billion in 2008, ENVTL.
LEADER (Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2007/09/28/consumerspending-on-green-will-double-reach-500-billion-in-2008/. For example, Arm & Hammer
Liquid Laundry Detergent is the only detergent with “renewable plant-based soaps to deliver
powerful cleaning;” Brammo Motorsports advertises that its Enertia Brand motorcycle is the
“world’s first production zero-emission battery powered plug-in electric motorcycle;” and
Panasonic advertises its large-screen plasma display as “environmentally friendly.” Id.
7. Sara Fister Gale, How to Get Green Goods Flying Off the Shelves, GREENBIZ.COM
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.greenbiz.com/feature/2009/03/02/how-get-green-goods-flyingoff-shelves.
8. Id.
SENWIRE
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confusion has emerged among consumers about how to determine the
truthfulness of environmental claims.9
Accurate advertising is critical for consumers trying to make productpurchasing decisions that have meaningful impacts on the environment.
The largest contributors and populations most vulnerable to climate change
are in urban locations.10 More than fifty percent of the world’s population
lives in cities and emits two-thirds of the total energy use worldwide.11
Coastal cities are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels, storm surges,
and flooding; heat trapping in urban landscapes with buildings and pavement creates threats of rising temperatures, increased levels of precipitation, and lower air quality.12 Because of these threats, city governments
have created climate action plans to lower energy consumption, promote
sustainability, and create energy efficiency.13 However, city governments
face significant obstacles in affecting climate change because of the need
for an effort involving not just governmental actors, but also a commitment
from society to change.14
Individuals in urban communities, armed with the knowledge that they
have both the greatest impact on climate change and the greatest opportunity to reduce its effects, can be motivated to make substantial changes in
their personal lives. On an individual level, that dedication is particularly
evidenced by their purchasing decisions. Thus, individual consumers must
be assured that the products they purchase do, in fact, promote social
change. Without the assurance of advertising accuracy, consumers could
potentially distrust environmentally beneficial products and lose a powerful
mechanism to positively impact climate change.
This Note will address the prominence of misleading and deceptive environmental claims that have prompted appeals for improved federal regula-

9. See Greg Zimmerman, The Rise and Significance of Eco-Labels and Green Product
Certifications, FACILITIES NET (July 2005), http://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article/
Certified-Green--3087.
10. See Cities and Climate Change: Key Message from the OECD, ORGANISATION FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/12/44272199.pdf.
11. Cities and Climate Change, C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP (2010),
http://www.c40cities.org/climatechange.jsp.
12. Id.
13. See Michele M. Betsill, Mitigating Climate Change in U.S. Cities: Opportunities
and Obstacles, 6 LOC. ENV’T 4, 393 (2001) (discussing the “Cities for Climate Protection”
campaign, which promotes methods municipal governments can use to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions); Martin LaMonica, Cities Take Lead in Climate Change, CNET NEWS (June
12, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-9963600-54.html.
14. Betsill, supra note 13, at 403.
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tion.15 Specifically, the Note will focus on the emerging trend of carbon
advertising and national and international models that provide guidance on
preventing deception. Part I will convey the current status of environmental advertising and the necessary background principles for establishing
regulations. Part II will detail major criticisms of the current environmental advertising guidelines and proposed models for restructuring environmental advertising regulations. Finally, Part III will propose a voluntary
national eco-labeling program that will address the current criticisms and
improve consumer confidence in environmentally-beneficial product purchases.
I. BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING
Part I conveys the historical, legal, and sociological framework for the
current green marketing regulations. First, Part I will examine the sociological trend of increased demand from consumers for green products and
the corresponding rise in deceptive environmental advertising practices.16
Part I will next address the governmental authority exercised by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate deceptive advertising in general and
discuss how advertising regulations can overcome First Amendment challenges. The current usage of environmental and energy advertising has
been monitored through third-party product certifications and the FTC’s
voluntary guidelines on environmental labeling. Despite the FTC’s authority in this area, one significant aspect of the debate is over which agency
should ultimately be responsible for environmental labeling regulations.
Part I thus examines whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has either express or implied authority to implement environmental advertising regulations, specifically a national eco-labeling program. Part I provides both national and international examples of labeling programs that
have created effective regulatory frameworks to look to for guidance in
modifying the current state of environmental labeling regulations. Finally,
Part I will discuss the newly-emerging issues surrounding environmental
advertising, specifically the increasing presence of carbon terminology, and
how any regulatory changes should take into account the new technology
and terminology to promote effective, accurate product labeling and ultimately increase consumer protection.

15. See Jennifer Woods, Of Selling the Environment—Buyer Beware? An Evaluation of
the Proposed F.T.C. Green Guides Revisions, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 75, 75-78 (2008).
16. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 313-14; Majoras, supra note 3 (“[C]onsumers are showing increasing interest in environmental issues and, importantly, this interest may be influencing their purchasing decisions.”).
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The Rise of Green Consumerism and Greenwashing

The general public’s increasing awareness of climate change created the
purchasing phenomenon known as “green consumerism,” in which environmentally-conscious shoppers purchase products that seemingly pose less
of an environmental threat.17 A study conducted in 2009 by WPP Green
Brands18 found that thirty-seven percent of consumers factored the environmental attributes of a product into their purchasing decisions, and seventy-seven percent of consumers considered a company’s “environmentally-friendly” reputation to be significant.19 As a result, green advertising
has the potential to produce environmental benefits through greater consumer awareness because it can aid consumers in making meaningful marketplace choices.20
The ubiquity of green advertising claims generally increases consumer
confidence that the claims have been substantiated, such that an individual
consumer believes he need not worry about conducting independent research to verify the accuracy of green advertising claims.21 However, with
respect to green advertising, the overwhelming presence of advertisements
touting environmental benefits has failed to indicate to consumers that the
claims are accurate.22 Many companies, more concerned with profitability
than ensuring that products meet specific standards, will “exaggerate or
even fabricate the environmental qualities of their goods, letting their advertising rhetoric far outstrip their environmental contributions.”23 These

17. Roger D. Wynne, Defining Green: Toward Regulation of Environmental Marketing
Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 785-86 (1991). For example, “magazines like Vanity Fair have released green issues and retailers like Wal-Mart and Home Deport have
launched green product lines.” Majoras, supra note 3, at 8-9.
18. WPP is a leading advertising and marketing services group that analyzed the research of five marketing companies on critical green trends. See About Us, WPP (2010),
http://www.wpp.com/wpp/about/.
19. Joe Fernandez, Product Claims: The Poisons That Pollutes Your Marketing, MARKETING WK., July 30, 2009, at 16, available at http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/poisonsthat-pollute-marketing/3002855; Press Release, WPP, 2009 Green Brands Survey Published
(July 22, 2009), available at http://www.wpp.com/wpp/press/press/default.htm?guid={
b983b1a9-ab92-4427-b75f-ab35f2565dad}#.
20. See Downs, supra note 2, at 158.
21. Alan Levy, Senior Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FTC’s Workshop
on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 73 (Jan. 8, 2008).
22. Wynne, supra note 17, at 787-88.
23. Id. at 787; see also John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some
Lessons From the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1994)
(“[M]anufacturers, striving for greater profits, may have an incentive to inflate or even lie
about the environmental attributes of their products.”); Luehr, supra note 2, at 313-14 (“As
competition mounts, so does the tendency of advertisers to make exaggerated or irrelevant
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companies “often change their labels but little else.”24 Advertisements also
frequently employ vague, undefined terms like “eco-friendly” or “green,”
which colloquially imply an environmental benefit, but when used in product labeling, “despite their ambiguity . . . imply that they are based upon
objective scientific investigation.”25 Yet, there is “no absolute measure of
earth-friendliness.”26 These claims are simply value judgments about the
overall impact of the product.27 Thus, one of the major critiques of corporate green advertising is that many are “reap[ing] the benefits of a green
reputation” without “actually creat[ing] social good” through substantial
changes to a company’s practices.28
“Greenwashing”—the buzzword for deception in green advertising—is
defined as the act of misleading consumers about the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product.29 Initially
coined in the 1980s, the term was used by environmental activists to criticize a company’s portrayal of itself as environmentally responsible while
engaging in harmful actions.30 One of the significant risks of greenwashing
is that consumers will become skeptical and cynical of environmentallyfriendly products.31 Marketing experts agree that the “term green is too
widespread to have any real marketing clout,” and “has become poisoned
through overuse.” 32
To determine the extensiveness of greenwashing, TerraChoice, an environmental marketing firm, conducted studies evaluating thousands of prod-

claims.”); Mario Teisel, Professor of Econ., Univ. of Me., Remarks at the FTC’s Workshop
on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 175 (Jan. 8, 2008).
24. Wynne, supra note 17, at 787.
25. Id. at 792.
26. Id. at 811 (“Broad terms like ‘environmentally responsible,’ therefore possess little
value; standing alone they are highly subjective, difficult to verify, and tend to create the
misleading impression that the product poses no harm to the environment.”); see also
Downs, supra note 2, at 168 (“[V]ague messages such as ‘environment-friendly’ and ‘earth
safe’ that are unsupported by any claims of specific environmental benefits are also problematic.”).
27. See Downs, supra note 2, at 168 (discussing that vague green claims are widely criticized as meaningless and confusing to consumers); Luehr, supra note 2, at 320.
28. Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 672, 681 (2009); see also Teisel, supra note
23 (discussing how companies adopt certification seals to improve their corporate image).
29. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG., GREENWASHING REPORT 2007, at 1 (2007) [hereinafter
TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2007], available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/
findings/greenwashing-report-2007/.
30. Fernandez, supra note 19.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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ucts and various types of environmental claims.33 In 2007, TerraChoice
evaluated over 1018 products and found that ninety-nine percent failed to
“live up fully to their green boasts.”34 Each product committed one of the
“sins of greenwashing,”35 indicating that the company’s product does not
fully achieve its claimed environmental benefits.36 In 2009, TerraChoice
conducted a follow-up study of 2219 products making 4996 green claims
and found that over ninety-eight percent committed at least one of the
greenwashing sins.37 An example of the “sin of the hidden trade-off” is
when a company advertises that its paper towels are made from a sustainably harvested forest, while the manufacturer’s shipping to global markets
causes extensive greenhouse gas emissions.38 The “sin of fibbing” was
found in numerous products falsely claiming to be Energy Star certified or
certified by a private organization.39 For example, in a House subcommittee hearing, Scot Case, Vice President of TerraChoice, described how one
consumer purchased an LG Energy Star certified refrigerator in 2007, but
in 2009, received a letter stating that his refrigerator did not qualify for
Energy Star status and that the company had certified the product anyway.40 The “sin” on the rise is “worshipping false labels,” where a product,
either through words or images, gives an impression that it possesses beneficial environmental attributes or private certification where none exist.41
With increasing frequency, manufacturers are using the color green in a
product’s packaging, such as a green bottle cap, an image of a tree, or a
green thumbs-up to create a subliminal message.42
33. See
About
Us,
TERRACHOICE
(2009),
http://www.terrachoice.com/Home/About%20Us.
34. Bryan Walsh, Eco Buyer Beware, TIME, Sept. 22, 2008, at 71; see TERRACHOICE,
GREENWASHING REPORT 2007, supra note 29; see also Woods, supra note 15, at 82.
35. According to TerraChoice, the “seven sins” are: (1) Sin of the Hidden Trade-off; (2)
Sin of No Proof; (3) Sin of Vagueness; (4) Sin of Worshipping False Labels; (5) Sin of Irrelevance; (6) Sin of Lesser of Two Evils; and (7) Sin of Fibbing. See The Seven Sins of
Greenwashing, TERRRACHOICE (2010), http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/the-sevensins/; see also David Gibson, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental Advertising, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 425 (2009).
36. Gibson, supra note 35, at 424.
37. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 3.
38. Walsh, supra note 34.
39. Karen Goldberg Goff, Green with Honesty, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at B01.
40. It’s Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Scot Case, Vice President, TerraChoice).
41. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 5.
42. Id. At the June 9, 2009 subcommittee hearings, Representative Gringrey echoed this
sentiment, stating that simply using the color green on a product, even without “saying anything about being environmentally friendly,” gives consumers a “subliminal message.” It’s
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Consumer education on the extensiveness of greenwashing has had a
substantial impact. Sixty-eight percent of adults now believe that most
companies are greenwashing their advertising claims.43 One company,
promoting the “Greenwashing Index,”44 is encouraging consumers to play
an active role in monitoring advertising claims by identifying instances of
greenwashing.45 One of the most notoriously criticized advertisements has
been Fiji’s claim that it is the first bottled water company to go “carbon
negative.”46 According to Fiji, purchasing a bottle of water actually reduces carbon emissions.47 Visitors of the Greenwashing Index have called the
advertising campaign an “outright falsehood,” done simply to increase Fiji’s reputation.48 General Electric global executive director of advertising
and marketing, Judy Hu, admitted that reputation, rather than environmental benefit, is often a company’s main concern.49 “It is about a business
opportunity,” she said, “[g]reen is green as in the color of money.”50
Going green may be trendy, but proponents of environmental change
through selective purchasing have raised the concern that “the sudden
‘over-hyping’ by the media of going green twists its message and turns environmentalism into a marketing tag.”51 They argue that increasing familiarity with the prevalence of greenwashing will make it increasingly difficult to mislead consumers, who will “be able to see through the green fog
that has been created.”52

Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Rep. Phil Gingrey, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
43. See Goff, supra note 39.
44. Greenwashing Index, ENVIROMEDIA SOCIAL MARKETING (2010), http://www.green
washingindex.com/.
45. The Ads, ENVIROMEDIA SOCIAL MARKETING (2010), http://www.greenwashing
index.com/ads.php.
46. Kimberly Maul, Fiji Water Has Its Consumers Seeing Green, PR WK., May 5, 2008,
at 7, available at http://www.prweekus.com/Fiji-Water-has-its-consumers-seeing-green/
article/109561/.
(2009),
47. Fiji
Green:
Our
Path
to
Sustainability,
FIJI
http://www.fijiwater.sg/Sustainability.aspx. Fiji’s factories do not operate solely on renewable energy and they still use planes and trucks to transport their products. Their claim is
based on a concept of “forward crediting,” by investing in carbon negative projects like reforestation and renewable energy initiatives. See Maul, supra note 46.
48. Walsh, supra note 34.
49. Gibson, supra note 35, at 426.
50. Id.
51. Purple Romero, Beware of Green Marketing Warns Greenpeace Exec, ABS-CBN
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/
09/16/08/beware-green-marketing-warns-greenpeace-exec.
52. Goff, supra note 39.
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Deceptive Advertising: Applying the FTC Framework to Green
Advertising

Though many companies have honestly advertised the environmental
attributes of their products, the threat of deceptive, misleading, and false
advertisements by other companies continues to affect consumers.53 The
FTC is the federal agency tasked with tackling deceptive advertising generally, and enforcing green advertising violations specifically.54
To address issues of consumer protection in the marketplace, Congress
passed the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),55 which empowered
the FTC to “prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”56 To implement that mission, the FTCA permits the FTC to “prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices.”57
“The FTC and the Courts have interpreted this power to include the authority to regulate false and misleading advertising and marketing claims.”58
Section 5 of the FTCA specifically prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.”59 A violation of a regulation passed under Section 5 constitutes
an automatic violation that has corresponding consequences.60 The FTC
can also pass voluntary guidelines for an industry, but these require the
FTC to prove on a case-by-case basis that the company’s practice would
likely deceive consumers.61
Section 12 of the FTCA “prohibits false ads likely to induce the purchase of food, drugs, devices or cosmetics. Section 15 defines a false ad
for purposes of Section 12 as one which is ‘misleading in a material re-

53. TERRACHOICE, GREENWASHING REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 3.
54. Sorting Out ‘Green’ Claims, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 1999), http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen02.shtm.
55. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)).
56. Legal Resources: Statutes Relating to Both Missions, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June
19, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat1.shtm.
57. Id.
58. Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1993).
59. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, sec. 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1994)).
60. Id.
61. Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 25, 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/append1.shtm.
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spect.’”62 Congress did not provide a definition for “unfair” or “deceptive”
in the FTCA which potentially could have clarified when an advertisement
is misleading.63 The FTC issued the FTC Policy Statement on Deception64
(“Deception Policy”) which provides a broader explanation of the terms.
The Deception Policy states three required elements for deception.65 First,
there must be a representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead the
consumer.66 Second, the practice must be examined from the perspective
of a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances.67 Finally, the
practice must be material, meaning it is likely to affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to the product.68
The Deception Policy was created in response to the decision in In re
Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,69 which struck down the long-standing definition
that an advertisement was deceptive so long as it had a capacity or tendency to deceive.70 The Deception Policy narrowed the definition by introducing a three-pronged test. 71 Under the first element, actual, explicit deception is not necessary; rather, a deceptive claim can arise either expressly or

62. Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception, appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *167 (1984) [hereinafter Policy
Statement on Deception].
63. Id. at *167-68; see Church, supra note 23, at 296; Wynne, supra note 17, at 789.
64. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 62.
65. See Church, supra note 23, at 298.
66. In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *79 (1984) (“It is
well settled that any advertising representation that has the tendency and capacity to mislead
or deceive a prospective purchaser is an unfair and deceptive practice which violated the
Federal Trade Commission Act.”); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 561 F.2d
357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[T]he Commission was entitled to conclude from the advertisements themselves and the stipulations of fact that the ads had a tendency and capacity to
mislead consumers.”); Church, supra note 23, at 299.
67. Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 62, at *79 (“Determination as to whether
an advertiser possessed and relied upon a ‘reasonable basis’ for believing a representation to
be true requires evaluation of ‘both the reasonableness of an advertiser’s action and the adequacy of the evidence upon which such actions were based.’”).
68. See Church, supra note 23, at 298.
69. 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *104 (“[T]he Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation,
omission, or practice is material.”).
70. See Simeon v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“[A]dvertisements capable of being interpreted in a misleading way should be construed
against the advertiser.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goodman v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that one purpose of the FTCA is to
eliminate business practices that could deceive consumers); Wynne, supra note 17, at 790.
71. See Wynne, supra note 17, at 790.
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impliedly.72 Whether a claim is implicitly deceptive is determined by “evaluating the contents of the advertisement and the circumstances surrounding it.”73 The second element of the FTC test is the advertisement’s ability
to mislead consumers. This element considers the percentage of people
who would view the advertisement as deceptive in order to determine
whether a consumer acted reasonably under the circumstances.74 Surveys
of consumer perception are often the most important evidence in establishing this element.75 If a claim meets the first and second elements, the court
next looks to whether the representation is material.76 Materiality requires
that the claim affects consumers’ choices.77 Both literally false and literally true but misleading advertisements can be actionable so long as the advertisement materially misleads consumers, meaning that the “consumer
would perceive some important message that differs from the reality of the
product.”78
While misleading advertisements are actionable, they “must be distinguished from the non-actionable, vague, subjective assertions common in
ads, known as puffery.”79 The Cliffdale decision that found puffery inactionable has been reaffirmed in subsequent decisions in federal courts.80

72. See Church, supra note 23, at 299 (noting that “express claims speak for themselves,” while implied claims are evaluated based on “the contents of the advertisement and
the circumstances surrounding it”).
73. Id.
74. Cliffdale, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *105; Church, supra note 23, at 300.
75. Carter Dillard, False Advertising, Animals, and Ethical Consumption, 10 ANIMAL L.
25, 55 (2004). Surveys will be scrutinized based on whether:
[1] the population was properly chosen and defined; [2] the sample chosen was
representative of that population; [3] the data gathered were accurately reported [];
[4] the data were analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical principles . . . [;]
[5] the questions asked were clear and not leading; [6] the survey was conducted
by qualified persons following proper interview procedures; and [7] the process
was conducted so as to ensure objectivity (e.g., was the survey conducted in anticipation of litigation and by persons connected with the parties or counsel or aware
of its purpose in the litigation?).
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.493 (1995).
76. Cliffdale, 1984 FTC LEXIS 71, at *107.
77. In re Am. Home Prods., 98 F.T.C. 136, 1981 FTC LEXIS 1, at *14 (1973) (“[T]he
existence of such a substantial question is a material fact, which, if known to consumers,
would be likely to affect their consideration of whether or not to purchase such products.”);
see Church, supra note 23, at 301.
78. Dillard, supra note 75, at 50-51. For example, “a package that was labeled ‘Potato
Chips’ but in fact contained chips that were made from dried potato granules, as opposed to
raw potatoes, was held to constitute false advertising.” Id. at 51.
79. Id. at 51.
80. See In re Southwest Sunsites, 105 F.T.C. 7, 1980 FTC LEXIS 86, at *324 (1985)
(“The Commission stated in Cliffdale that an act or practice is deceptive if it consists of a
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The concept asserts that a statement is “merely puffery,” rather than “deceptive,” if one “cannot refute the message with objective evidence.”81
Thus, questions for green advertising include: “When is a green marketing
claim unlawful? [And] [h]ow far can manufacturers stretch the truth of vague terms like ‘environmentally friendly’ before they enter the realm of deceptiveness?”82
C.

Commercial Speech: First Amendment Challenges to Advertising
Regulation

Manufacturers and industry groups have opposed advertising regulations
specifically pertaining to product labeling on the grounds that it is a First
Amendment violation of their commercial speech rights.83 Interpretations
of the First Amendment can therefore impact the creation of a national ecolabeling program, particularly one that contains specific definitions of environmental terms.84
1.

The Legal Precedent for Commercial Speech Regulations

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court held “for the first time that speech
which does nothing more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled
to First Amendment Protection.”86 The Court reasoned that commercial
advertising is a form of protected expression because it aids intelligent and
informed choices by consumers.87 The Court further clarified the meaning
of “commercial speech” in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,88 by outlining
factors that distinguish commercial speech.89

representation, omission or practice that is both material and likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the circumstances.”); see also Wynne, supra note 17, at 790.
81. Dillard, supra note 75, at 51.
82. Wynne, supra note 17, at 803.
83. Id. at 813; see also Jamie Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147, 183 (1993).
84. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 184.
85. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
86. David Hoch & Robert Franz, Legal Developments: Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV.
441, 447 (1994) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
87. Id. (discussing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65, describing that society “may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information”).
88. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
89. These factors include: (1) whether money is spent to project it; (2) whether the
speech is carried in a publication sold for profit; (3) whether the speech solicits money; or
(4) whether the speech is on a commercial subject. Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of En-
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The Court established a four prong test to determine the constitutionality
of restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.90 There, the issue was whether New
York’s ban on promotional advertising by electric utilities violated the First
Amendment.91 The Court held that for commercial speech to be protected
by the First Amendment it must: first, “concern lawful activity and not be
misleading;” second, the regulation must be supported by a substantial
government interest; third, the law must directly advance the asserted government interest; and finally, the regulation cannot be more extensive than
necessary to accomplish the government interest.92 In Board of Trustees v.
Fox,93 the Court diluted the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test by interpreting it to “employ not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”94 Despite the
First Amendment protection that is granted to commercial speech, false or
misleading commercial speech is excluded from any such protection.95
The most recent challenge pitting environmental advertising regulations
against commercial speech protection arose in Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren.96 In 1992, the Association of National Advertisers (“Association”) filed a suit against the California Attorney General
challenging a California statute97 that defined several environmental terms
and regulated their use in product advertising unless they met the statutory
definition.98 The Association claimed the statute violated its commercial

vironmental Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme Court’s Protection of Commercial
Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1994); see also Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 477 (1989); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973) (defining commercial speech as speech that does “no more than propose a
commercial transaction”).
90. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
91. Id. at 560; Tarsney, supra note 89, at 548.
92. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
93. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,—a fit that is not necessarily perfect,
but reasonable.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Brett B. Coffee, Environmental Marketing After Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren: Still Searching For An Improved Regulatory Framework, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1995); Tarsney,
supra note 89, at 550.
95. Coffee, supra note 94, at 315 (“Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection only if the speech is not misleading.”); Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends On What the
Meaning of False Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 227, 227 (2007) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
96. 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508 (West 1995).
98. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 727; Coffee, supra note 94, at 300-01.
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speech rights under the First Amendment.99 The Association argued that
the statute “threw the regulatory requirements of national marketers into
disorder and confusion” and created an “onerous burden on their ability to
effectively communicate with the public.”100 The Ninth Circuit evaluated
the statute under the Central Hudson test and concluded that California’s
interest in environmental and consumer protection was directly promoted
by the statute.101 The State sought to protect against the legitimate concern
of the “direct, predictable and ongoing result of green marketing—
increased sales of goods as a result of potentially specious claims or ecological puffery about products with minimal environmental attributes.”102
Furthermore, the Court stated that “the statute increases consumer knowledge and awareness and discourages exploitation and deception”103 because the monitoring provides a protective function that the average consumer cannot sufficiently perform.104
2.

Overcoming First Amendment Limitations

Based on the decision in Association of National Advertisers v. California, it is likely that the First Amendment would not pose a major obstacle
to promulgating enforceable environmental advertising regulations.105 The
Supreme Court has upheld other labeling legislation, such as the Organic
Food and Production Act and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act,
which suggests that “courts generally defer to regulatory limitations on
commercial speech that fall short of comprehensive bans on advertising.”106 In fact, the Supreme Court has even upheld federal labeling laws
that compel commercial speech, such as provisions requiring manufacturers
to provide explicit warnings to consumers.107 These laws extend far

99. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 728; Coffee, supra note 94, at 301.
100. Coffee, supra note 94, at 310-11.
101. See Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 735.
102. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 94, at 331.
103. Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 44 F.3d at 733.
104. See Coffee, supra note 94, at 331.
105. Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It’s A Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It A Sneetches Kind of
Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 193-94 (1998); see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 184-85
(“The First Amendment should not present a major barrier to environmental labeling statutes.”).
106. Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Grodsky, supra note 83, at 185-86
(citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569-70
(1980)).
107. This is known as mandatory, negative content labeling. See Elliot B. Staffin, Trade
Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the
“Greening” of World Trade, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 211 (1996). A government man-
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beyond the voluntary frameworks that have been suggested for environmental advertising.
Using the Central Hudson framework, an environmental labeling
scheme is likely to meet the first prong because deceptive speech is not
protected by the First Amendment.108 Environmental advertising terms
“implying general environmental benefits . . . are arguably deceptive per
se.”109 Furthermore, such regulations would encourage well-informed decisions in the marketplace because they are created to ensure accuracy and
enhance “the market’s ability to serve as a mechanism not only of individual benefit to consumers and manufacturers, but also of environmental improvement.”110 Next, it is likely a court would give considerable deference
to such advertising regulations because they concern potentially misleading
speech.111 Also, the government has a substantial interest in both protecting citizens from deceptive advertising, and promoting environmental policy.112 Finally, environmental regulation is not only designed to achieve the
government’s interest, but “[l]abeling laws that establish minimum thresholds . . . are far less restrictive than . . . laws that require manufacturers to
meet or exceed” specific requirements.113 Manufacturers are only required
to comply with the statute if they choose to make environmental claims for
their products.114
D.

The Current Framework for Environmental Advertising
1.

Third Party Environmental Certification

Numerous private certification companies have emerged to fill the void
created by the lack of government regulations.115 Private companies have
put forth their own standards for what constitutes an “environmentallyfriendly” product and award a certification seal of approval to a product
that meets their specific standards.116 These seals are intended to provide

dated program requires product labeling prior to a sale that contains an environmentally
harmful substance. Id. In the United States, the Clean Air Act requires products that contain
chlorofluocarbons to have a warning label. Id.; see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 185.
108. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Tushnet, supra note 95.
109. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 187.
110. Wynne, supra note 17, at 815.
111. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 187.
112. See id. at 187-88.
113. Id. at 189.
114. See id. at 190.
115. See Downs, supra note 2, at 172.
116. See id. at 173.
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verification to consumers that a product meets certain standards established
by the organization.117
Because adopting an eco-seal is voluntary, a company’s labeling initiative can indicate to consumers that the company is genuinely concerned
with improving the environmental attributes of its products.118 As discussed above, with consumers’ increased desire to make socially responsible choices in their purchases, private certification may increase consumer
interest in the product.
Currently, there are two prominent eco-labeling programs that provide
certification to companies and products with general environmental benefits.119 “Both seal programs attempt to provide accurate information to
consumers about the environmental impact of products, while encouraging
manufacturers to develop more environmentally sound products.”120 In
1989, Green Seal founded the first United States environmental seal of approval program.121 Green Seal is an independent, non-profit organization
dedicated to “protecting the environment by promoting the manufacture
and sale of environmentally responsible consumer products.”122 Green
Seal grants a certification mark to products satisfying predetermined environmental criteria.123 Once a product is certified, a manufacturer pays a fee
to Green Seal and can then use the seal of approval on their product.124
The second company, Green Cross, now known as Scientific Certification
Systems (SCS), issues an “Environmental Report Card,” a content-neutral
scheme that is designed solely to convey information about a product’s environmental impact.125 SCS determines which product categories to test
and conducts an analysis to quantify a product’s significant outputs during
each stage of its life cycle.126
While these certifications can provide information to a consumer, often
they are a consumer’s “only clue to the product’s environmental impact”

117. See Zimmerman, supra note 9. Home Depot, for example, adopted a labeling initiative in 2007, transfixing an Eco Options brand label to approximately three thousand products. See Church, supra note 23, at 287-88 (“When consumers doubt a seller’s claim, a third
party evaluation or certification may . . . [have] the seller [rely] on the reputation of the third
party evaluator.”).
118. See Church, supra note 23, at 287.
119. See Downs, supra note 2, at 172.
120. Israel, supra note 58, at 322.
121. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 201-02.
122. Id. at 201.
123. See id. at 202.
124. See id.
125. Staffin, supra note 107, at 230-32.
126. See id. at 233.

FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN

10/13/2010 6:52 PM

1018

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

prior to the purchase.127 Though the FTC issues consumer guides to provide advice on environmental claims, about one in three consumers still assert that they do not know how to tell if green product claims are true.128
2.

FTC’s Framework: The Green Guides
a.

History of the Green Guides

Responding to public pressure to address the rise of deceptive environmental advertising, the FTC created the Guides for the Use of Environmental Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”) in 1992.129 The National Association of Attorney Generals (NAAG), a group of state attorney generals,130
published the Green Report,131 which called “specifically for federal definitions of environmental marketing terms, federal testing protocols . . . and
strong federal involvement.”132 Even major corporations and manufacturers advocated for binding regulations and uniform standards to provide
“national consistency” and “sufficient incentive for manufacturers to produce better products.”133

127. Downs, supra note 2, at 173.
128. See id. at 167 n.52.
129. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug.
13, 1992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1994), revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311 (1996)); see
also FTC Chairman Steiger Announces National Guidelines to Prevent Misleading Environmental Marketing Claims, Fed. Trade Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter FTC
Chairman Steiger], available at http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf. The Green
Guides were based on the FTC’s review of data obtained from investigations, FTC hearings,
and public comments. Summary of FTC Environmental Marketing Guidelines, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Summary of Guidelines], available at
http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf.
130. The NAAG was composed of eight State Attorney Generals who formed an ad hoc
task force and sponsored a public forum where forty different organizations testified about
standards for environmental advertising. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 314, 336 n.18.
131. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ADVERTISING (1990) [hereinafter THE GREEN
REPORT]. In May 1991, after holding additional hearings, the Task Force issued a second
Green Report, which combined the findings. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE
GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING
(1991) [hereinafter THE GREEN REPORT II]; see also Jeremy Abidiwan-Lupo, The Green
Marketing Machine: Tackling Green Advertising in the Automobile Industry, 27 TEMP. J.
SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 359, 363-64 (2009).
132. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 131, at iv; see also Israel, supra note 58, at 317-18;
Manufacturers, Retailers Petition FTC to Adopt Uniform Labeling Guidelines, ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP., Feb. 21, 1991, at 279.
133. Israel, supra note 58, at 318.
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While the FTC considered developing environmental regulations,134 environmentalists petitioned the EPA to develop scientific standards and definitions “capable of advancing a policy of environmental protection while
preventing consumer deception.”135 The EPA responded by announcing
plans to formulate voluntary national guidelines.136 The EPA proposed to:
“(1) establish standards for the legitimate use of environmental claims; (2)
determine the environmental benefits of various products; and (3) aid government officials and manufacturers in applying a life-cycle product assessment.”137
Also during this period, two bills were proposed in the Senate authorizing the EPA to “create voluntary national guidelines for environmental
marketing terminology.”138 The bills required the EPA to set definitional
standards and mandated a public education program to raise awareness of
environmental marketing.139 However, the bills did not garner enough
congressional support and both died in the Senate.140
Following congressional defeat of the bills, the FTC announced its publication of the Green Guides.141 The emergence of FTC Guides “squelched
all attempts to put EPA at the helm of the environmental marketing movement.”142 In its announcement, the FTC “underscored the difference between its goals and those of the EPA,”143 namely that “the Guides are neither based on nor intended to implement environmental policy.”144 FTC
Chairwoman Janet Steiger further stated that any environmental impact
134. The FTC held its own hearings in July 1991 on the issue of environmental marketing
regulations. See Sunshine Act Meetings, Public Hearings Concerning Environmental Claims
and Product Labeling and Marketing, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,472 (July 16, 1991). Following the
publication of the Guides, the FTC sought public comment and the subsequent revisions
were published on October 11, 1996.
135. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 162.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 160; see also Grodsky, supra note 83, at 166 (“The proposed Environmental
Marketing Claims Act would have directed the EPA to verify that each environmental marketing claim is related to a ‘specific’ environmental impact to ensure that it is not false, misleading or deceptive, and that it has been scientifically substantiated.”).
139. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 160-61.
140. See id. at 161.
141. See The Green Guides, supra note 129; FTC Chairman Steiger, supra note 129.
The Green Guides were based on the FTC’s review of data obtained from investigations,
FTC hearings, and public comments. See The Green Guides, supra note 129.
142. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 142.
143. Id. at 163 (citing Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides:
Public Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991)).
144. Relating to the Federal Trade Commission’s Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims, Fed. Trade Comm’n, July 28, 1992, at 3, available at
http://www.p2pays.org/ref/32/31545.pdf.
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would be minimized because the Green Guides are simply voluntary guidelines.145 Instead, they are merely intended to promote “voluntary compliance with such laws by members of industry.”146 Because the guidelines
are voluntary, environmental claims are evaluated under the same standard
of typical deceptive trade practices and result in FTC action only if the
practices directly violate enforceable statutory provisions.147 By rejecting
the EPA’s environmental expertise, “put simply, the agency with enforcement expertise lacks the appropriate mission, and the agency with the mission lacks enforcement authority.”148
b.

The Green Guides’ Requirements for Environmental Claims

The Green Guides state that “it is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or
by implication, that a product, package, or service offers a general environmental benefit.”149 Any environmental qualifications or disclosures for
a product must be made “sufficiently clear and prominent,”150 and manufacturers must clarify whether a claim applies to a product, its packaging,
or a service.151 Furthermore, an environmental claim is not permitted to
overstate a benefit and an advertisement comparing products is required to
state a substantiated basis.152
Additionally, the Guides elaborate on six categories pertaining to recycling, waste management, and depletion of the ozone layers,153 which were
the prominent environmental terms used in green advertising during the
1990s. The product categories provide obscure definitions for terms like
“biodegradable,” “compostable,” “recyclable,” and “ozone friendly.”154

145. Id. at 4; Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 364 (“While the Guide uses a strong and
commanding tone, the provisions contained therein are not enforceable and have no lawful
force or effect.”).
146. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (1996);
see also Jeremy Rosen, Requirements for Environmental Marketing Claims Under the Federal Trade Commission’s Guidelines, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 241, 243 (1997).
147. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996).
148. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 176.
149. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (1996); see Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 1-2.
150. Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 1.
151. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (1996); see also Summary of Guidelines, supra note 129, at
2.
152. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.6(d) (1996); see also Rosen, supra note 146, at 244; Summary
of Guidelines, supra note 129, at 2.
153. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a)-(h); see also Gregory Bibler et al., Making the Case for
Your Green Marketing Claims, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=66476 (describing the categories
of claims discussed in the Guides).
154. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(b)-(h).
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The terms are intentionally vague because the definitions are not scientific,
but instead are based on the FTC’s belief of possible “reasonable interpretations” of the terms to consumers.155 Broad claims are thus considered
deceptive only when a claim cannot be substantiated at all by any scientific
evidence.156
E.

The EPA’s Authority to Regulate Environmental Advertising

Because environmental advertising regulations require an “intricate
weaving of environmental policy and consumer protection principles,” the
question arises whether the EPA has the authority to implement advertising
regulations and an eco-labeling program without overstepping its congressional mandate.157
Currently, the EPA is the chief enforcement agency for five main
areas,158 and in each of these areas, the Agency has promulgated labeling
regulations.159 For example, the Solid Waste Disposal Act prompted a
labeling directive requiring lubricating oil to bear a statement urging recycling to promote the minimization of hazardous waste.160 The EPA also
promulgated labeling regulations pertaining to ozone depletion in response
to the Clean Air Act of 1990.161
One prominent EPA labeling program is ENERGY STAR (“Energy
Star”), a voluntary labeling program that awards companies the label when
they meet the established criteria for energy efficiency.162 Energy Star was
established and is regulated jointly by the EPA and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) without congressional authorization.163 The
goals of Energy Star are to provide consumers with energy efficient prod-

155. Woods, supra note 15, at 78.
156. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996); see also Policy Statement Regarding Advertising
Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999-31,003 (Aug. 2. 1984); Woods, supra note 15,
at 78 (stating that one commissioner explained that the Guides require acceptance of any
and all reasonable interpretations).
157. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 172.
158. The five main areas are: (1) compliance with vehicle emissions standards; (2)
placement of warning labels on ozone-detrimental products; (3) participation in the national
recycling and emissions reduction program; (4) elimination of nonessential products containing chlorofluorocarbons; and (5) greenhouse gas emissions. See Cavanagh, supra note
105, at 164-65.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671(j) (1998); Staffin, supra note 107, at 213.
162. See Stacey O’Neill, Consuming for the Environment: A Proposal for Carbon Labels
in the U.S., 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 393, 406 (2009).
163. See History of Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=
about.ab_history (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
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ucts,164 and to “identify and promote energy-efficient products to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.”165 To implement these goals, the DOE sets
minimum energy efficiency requirements for each product category.166
The program then partners with manufacturers of the products that are eligible for Energy Star certification.167 Manufacturers can seek Energy Star
certification by making a set of commitments that their products meet the
energy efficiency criteria.168 The EPA signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the manufacturer that outlines the responsibilities of each
party, provides the manufacturer with the Energy Star approval logo, and
adds the manufacturer to a published list of certified products and companies.169
To date, over twelve thousand private and public organizations have
partnered with Energy Star.170 Energy Star labels appear on over sixty
product categories and thousands of products in the United States.171 The
success of the program is apparent not only by the high participation in this
voluntary program, but in the recorded cost savings of seventeen billion
dollars in 2009 alone.172 An additional success is consumer recognition
and awareness of the label: seventy-six percent of households now recognize the Energy Star label, and of that percentage, seventy-eight percent
had a high or general understanding of the label’s purpose.173 “By increasing consumer awareness and facilitating the purchase of energy efficient
products, the Energy Star program has likely generated significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.”174 The expansiveness of the Energy
Star labeling program and its focus on energy efficiency through the reduc-

164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 214-15. The list of appliances includes refrigerators,
freezers, water heaters, air conditioners, heat pumps, washers, dishwashers, furnaces, lamps,
showerheads, faucets, and water closets. See Find Energy Star Products, ENERGY STAR,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=products.pr_find_es_products (last visited Sept. 29,
2010).
167. See Michael A. Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: PreferenceDirected Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 328 (2007); see
also Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 167.
168. See Livermore, supra note 167.
169. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 167-68; see also Livermore, supra note 167.
170. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 416; History of Energy Star, supra note 163.
171. History of Energy Star, supra note 163.
172. Id.
173. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AWARENESS OF ENERGY STAR FOR 2008:
ANALYSIS OF CEE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ES1 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.energy
star.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/National%20Awareness%20of%20ENERGY%20
STAR%202008%20to%20EPA_4-9-09.pdf.
174. Livermore, supra note 167, at 329.
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tion of greenhouse gas emissions implies that the EPA has the authority to
implement a national labeling program to educate and incentivize consumers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Despite its commitment to the Energy Star program, in Massachusetts v.
EPA,175 the EPA argued that the Clean Air Act176 neither authorized the
EPA to address climate change nor gave it the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.177 In this case, a group
of states, local governments, and private organizations brought suit against
the EPA for “abdicat[ing] its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide.”178 The Clean Air Act provides that the EPA administrator should
create standards for the emissions of any air pollutant from any class of
new motor vehicles.179 The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is admitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”180 The EPA, however, denied
that it had the authority to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant because “carbon dioxide is not an air pollutant as that term is defined in §
7602.”181 The Supreme Court disagreed and found that that carbon dioxide
was included in the “Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant.’”182 The Court held that “[c]arbon dioxide . . . [is] without a doubt [a]
‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance which [is] emitted into . . . the ambient air.’ The statute is unambiguous.”183 Accordingly, the Court held
that “[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant’ . . . [the] EPA has the statutory authority
to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.”184
Although the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA specifically pertained to the
regulation of new motor vehicles, it is significant to note that the Supreme

175. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
176. “The Clean Air Act is the comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions
from stationary and mobile sources. . . . Section 112 of the Clean Air Act addresses emissions of hazardous air pollutants.” Summary of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/caa.html.
177. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427-28.
178. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427.
179. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 506 (citing the Clean Air Act, § 202 (a)(1),
as added by Pub. L. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992 and amended by 84 Stat. 1690 and 91
Stat. 791, at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).
180. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)).
181. Id. at 528.
182. Id.; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 428.
183. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529.
184. Id. at 532; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 428.
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Court has recognized the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse gases, including carbon emissions.185 The EPA’s initial reluctance to regulate carbon emissions, however, suggests that it may be equally reluctant to impose
a voluntary nationwide eco-labeling effort in the United States,186 particularly without a direct congressional mandate.
F.

Eco-Labeling Experience: Current United States and
International Frameworks

In considering the implementation of a carbon eco-labeling program, a
closer look at other labeling models provides guidance. This section first
examines the framework for “organic” labeled products in the United
States, which has achieved national success with a non-binding voluntary
labeling program that issued uniform definitions. Second, Germany’s Blue
Angel program is a prime example of how an eco-labeling program can integrate the public and private sector in addition to building credibility
among consumers. Finally, the recent creation of the United Kingdom
Carbon Trust shows a public-private hybrid model specifically pertaining
to carbon labeling that is becoming increasingly successful over time.
1.

The Organic Foods Product Act: Organic Products Labeling

In the early 1990s, organic farming became a practice that has maintained both its social popularity and continually increasing sales.187 In
1990, sales of organic products in the United States were one billion dollars.188 Between 1992 and 1997, organic cropland more than doubled.189
Sales increased twenty percent annually from 1990 to 2000,190 and in 2008,
organic sales in the United States reached nearly twenty-three billion dol-

185. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 429; see also John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 25 (2008).
186. O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 427.
187. CATHERINE R. GREENE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. ORGANIC FARMING EMERGES IN
THE 1990S, ADOPTION OF CERTIFIED SYSTEMS 1 (2001), available at http://www.
ers.usda.gov/Publications/AIB770/ (stating that organic farming systems prohibit the use of
synthetic chemicals in crop production and hormones in livestock).
188. ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY, INDUSTRY STATISTICS
AND PROJECTED GROWTH (2007), available at http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html
[hereinafter 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY].
189. Lauren Zeichner, Product v. Process: Two Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engineered Foods and How They Relate to Consumer Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y J. 467, 471 (2004); see also GREENE, supra note 187, at 7 tbl.4.
190. See GREENE, supra note 187, at 2-3; Zeichner, supra note 189;.
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lars.191 Organic product sales are still anticipated to continue rising steadily, despite their premium prices in an economic recession.192
Similar to consumer incentives with environmental labels, the average
consumer’s “willingness to pay a premium for products bearing the ‘organic’ label is based, in significant part, on the perception that he/she will receive a product with special attributes . . . . These attributes . . . create a
brand image and justify the increased cost.”193 A recent 2009 study on
United States families’ organic attitudes and beliefs substantiated this
claim.194 The study found that seventy-three percent of families buy organic products at least occasionally, primarily because they believe organic
products possess specialized and increased benefits.195
Prior to 1990, there were no regulations governing organic standards or
product labeling; instead, private companies created their own standards
and certifications.196 However, the proliferation of organic products caused
confusion among consumers, who could not verify the authenticity of organic claims.197 As a result, conflicting and misleading claims threatened
to undermine consumer confidence in organic products.198 In turn, consumers and retailers became reluctant to purchase organic products.199
Consumers were unable to find organic food in major supermarkets because of “large food distributors’ skepticism regarding organic claims and
their inability to work directly with growers on certification.”200
In response to the misleading claims, conflicting standards, and consumer confusion, Congress enacted the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA)
of 1990.201 The OFPA has three main goals: (1) establish national standards
governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically produced; (2) assure consumers that organically produced products met a con-

191. See ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2009 ORGANIC INDUSTRY SURVEY 1 (May 2009), available at http://www.organicnewsroom.com/2009/05/organic_trade_association_rele_1.html.
192. See 2007 OTA MANUFACTURER SURVEY, supra note 188, at 2.
193. A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry: Coming to
Terms With Big Organics and Other Legal Challenges for the Industry’s Next Ten Years, 12
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 17, 32 (2007).
194. See ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, 2009 U.S. FAMILIES’ ORGANIC ATTITUDES & BELIEFS
STUDY 2 (2009).
195. See id.
196. See Zeichner, supra note 189.
197. See Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 872 (2009).
198. See id.; see also Tushnet, supra note 95, at 241.
199. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197.
200. Endres, supra note 193, at 20; see also S. Rep. No. 101-357, at 267 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4944.
201. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6515 (2004); see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 472.
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sistent standard; and (3) facilitate interstate commerce.202 Accordingly, the
OFPA provides “national standards for organic production so that farmers
know the rules, so that consumers are sure to get what they pay for, and so
national and international trade in organic foods may prosper.”203 The focus of the OFPA is not to promote the healthiness or nutritional quality of
organic products;204 rather, it is a marketing-oriented statute designed to
reduce consumer confusion.205
The OFPA delegated responsibility to the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to implement the statute by establishing uniform standards for organic products as well as a certification program.206 The Act
created the National Organic Program (NOP) within the USDA to develop
the details of the organic regulations.207 The NOP created standards with
the input of the National Organics Standards Board, which was composed
of farmers, handlers, retailers, consumers, environmentalists, and scientists
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.208 The regulations also created
USDA-accredited agents—largely private entities who grant certification if
a product complies with established organic standards.209 The organic producers select their own accrediting agents to obtain organic certification.210
2.

International Success: Germany’s Blue Angel Program

Germany, “touted as the ‘pioneer’ of eco labels,”211 instituted the first
government-sponsored certification in 1977 called the “Blue Angel Program.”212 The program relies on voluntary commitments from manufactur-

202. 7 U.S.C. § 6501; see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 472.
203. Endres, supra note 193, at 20 (citing S. REP. No. 101-357, at 267 (1990)); see also
Tushnet, supra note 95, at 241 (citing Labels, Labeling, and Market Information, 7 C.F.R. §
205.300 (2007), which requires that organic products have at least ninety-five percent organic content and the remainder must be on an approved list of ingredients).
204. See Endres, supra note 193, at 20; see also Grading, Certification, and Verification,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?
template=TemplateA&navID=GradingCertificationandVerfication&leftNav=Grading
CertificationandVerfication&page=GradingCertificationAndVerification (last modified May
29, 2009).
205. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 874.
206. See 7 U.S.C. § 6503(a) (2004); see also Zeichner, supra note 189, at 473.
207. See 7 U.S.C. § 6504 (2004).
208. See Zeichner, supra note 189, at 473.
209. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6514-6515 (2004); Endres, supra note 193.
210. See 7 U.S.C. § 6515.
211. Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 194.
212. Id.; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365 (“Germany does not have a particular statute prohibiting green advertising, but does have a government-sponsored national
eco-labeling program called the Blue Angel program.”).

FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN

2010]

THE NEXT GENERATION OF GREENWASH

10/13/2010 6:52 PM

1027

ers rather than a mandatory labeling program.213 Germany’s regulation is
now a model replicated by other similar regulatory systems around the
world.214
The Blue Angel Program develops product categories and awards ecolabels to products that comply with the determined criteria.215 The process
for creating an eco-label category requires a proposal to the Federal Environmental Agency,216 which reports to the Environmental Label Jury, an
agency charged with reviewing and choosing categories for the program.217
The Environmental Label Jury is composed of representatives from union,
consumer, industrial, and environmental organizations.218 The Environmental Label Jury examines public and governmental proposals219 and decides which proposed categories should be tested by the Federal Environmental Institute.220 The Federal Environmental Agency then performs
testing using a life cycle analysis to determine at what stage a product has
the most significant environmental impact.221 The Federal Environmental
Agency drafts criteria for an approved product group and forwards it to the
German Institute for Quality Assurance and Labeling (“Institute”) for further review.222 The Institute holds hearings where industry representatives,
consumer and environmental organizations, scientists, and testing institutes
ask questions and make comments on the proposed criteria.223 The Institute forwards its comments on the criteria to the Environmental Labeling
Jury, which has the final authority to approve a new category for ecolabels.224
After a new category has been approved, manufacturers can submit their
products to the Federal Environmental Agency to determine if they meet

213. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365.
214. See id.; see also Cavanaugh, supra note 105, at 198-200.
215. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365.
216. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE (2006), http://www.greenlabelspurchase.
net/oe-blue-angel.html; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 365-66.
217. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225.
218. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 194.
219. See id.
220. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225.
221. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE, supra note 216; see also Abidiwan-Lupo,
supra note 131, at 366.
222. The Blue Angel, GREENLABELSPURCHASE, supra note 216; see also Abidiwan-Lupo,
supra note 131, at 366.
223. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366.
224. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225. Examples of final standards for a product category include: (1) minimum levels of energy consumption; (2) utilization of recycled materials; (3) product biodegradability; (4) prohibition of certain hazardous substances; and (5)
reduced noise levels. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 195.
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the required criteria.225 “The manufacturer’s criteria are verified by evaluating ‘statements from the manufacturer, testing by independent facilities,
and data and product information sheets.’”226 If the criteria are met, the
Blue Angel Program enters into an agreement with the manufacturer which
permits them to use the Blue Angel logo on that product’s packaging and
direct product advertising for three years in exchange for a licensing fee. 227
The agreement requires the manufacturer to pay an annual fee based on estimated annual sales of the products and a contribution to the advertising
fund for the Blue Angel Program.228
Since 1993, the Blue Angel eco-label has appeared on over 3500 products in approximately seventy-five product categories.229 The Blue Angel
eco-label is used by approximately 895 licensees for approximately 11,500
products.230 The label has a recognition rate of seventy-nine percent
among consumers.231 Its success has shown that over time, consumer
awareness of a brand, understanding environmental issues, and trust in a
label’s credibility can be accomplished.
3.

UK Carbon Trust: A Carbon Eco-Labeling Model

In 2001, the British government created the Carbon Trust, an independent company, to work with private organizations to reduce their overall
carbon emissions and develop low carbon technologies.232 Carbon Trust
provides “specialist support to business and the public sector to help cut
carbon emissions, save energy and commercialise low carbon technologies.”233
Carbon Trust created the Carbon Trust Footprinting Company, which
works with companies “to measure, reduce and communicate the lifecycle

225. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225-26.
226. Abidwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366 (quoting Environmental Labeling Issues,
Policies, and Practices Worldwide, EPA Doc. No. 742-R-98-009 app. B-49, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY (1998), http://www.epa.gov/epp/pubs.wwlabel3.php).
227. See Staffin, supra note 107, at 225-26. Staffin notes that while there is some variation in the administrative structure of voluntary eco-labeling programs, most follow the
same process of selecting of categories, testing, setting criteria, and awarding seals of approval. Id. at 224.
228. See Abidwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 366.
229. The Blue Angel in Numbers, THE BLUE ANGEL, http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/
blauer_engel/balance/index.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2010); see also Staffin, supra note
107, at 226.
230. The Blue Angel in Numbers, THE BLUE ANGEL, supra note 229.
231. Id.
232. See O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 421.
233. About the Carbon Trust: What We Do, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www.
carbontrust.co.uk/about-carbon-trust/what-we-do/pages/default.aspx.
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of their products and services.”234 It attempts to address consumer needs by aiding individuals in making choices
to lower their respective carbon footprints.235 In 2009, the Carbon Trust
Footprinting Certification Company was established “to provide independent and impartial certification services for product carbon footprints.”236
The company applies a standard set of criteria to product categories measuring the carbon footprint of products and services.237 To calculate a
company’s carbon footprint, the company itself uses Carbon Trust’s “Footprint Expert,” a toolkit that allows organizations to calculate their footprints
as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.238 If a company’s carbon
footprint is in compliance with the certification requirements of the “Footprint Expert” within that product category, the Carbon Trust Footprinting
Certification Company will provide certification to the company and their
products.239 A company’s products and services can then display the Carbon Reduction Label, which shows the product’s carbon footprint throughout its lifecycle.240 A company that chooses to place the label on their
product is signaling a commitment to consumers to reduce the carbon footprint of that product; if the company does not reduce their carbon footprint
within two years, the label will be withdrawn. 241
Since the introduction of the Carbon Reduction Label,242 “there are
twenty companies with approximately seventy-five products” using the
carbon labeling program.243 These include major companies, such as Boots
(Europe’s leading pharmacy and beauty chain stores), PepsiCo, Tesco Su-

234. About the Carbon Trust Footprinting Company, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://
www.carbon-label.com/business/about.htm.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The Footprinting Process, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www.carbonlabel.com/business/footprintingProcess.htm; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 423-24.
The measurement process requires: (1) building a process map, including setting boundaries, understanding available data, and identifying sources; (2) collecting primary data from
members of the supply chain and collating secondary data; (3) assessing materiality; and (4)
building the carbon footprint. The Footprinting Process, supra.
238. The Footprinting Process, supra note 237.
239. Independent Certification, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://www.carbon-label.
com/business/certification.htm.
240. See The Carbon Reduction Label Explained, THE CARBON TRUST (2009), http://
www.carbon-label.com/business/label.htm.
241. See O’Neill, supra note 162, at 422.
242. Carbon Trust Launches Carbon Reduction Label, THE CARBON TRUST, at 1 (Mar.
16, 2007), http://www.carbon-label.com/news/16.03.07.pdf; see also O’Neill, supra note
162, at 424 (“Carbon labels were unveiled on shelves in the UK in April 2007.”).
243. O’Neill, supra note 162, at 424.
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permarkets, Coca-Cola, Marshalls, and Kimberly Clark.244 While a majority of consumers still do not understand the meaning of carbon footprints,
consumers still have “welcomed having environmental information on
products.”245 A June 2009 Carbon Trust survey of one thousand consumers
across the UK found that almost two-thirds of consumers were more likely
to buy a product if they knew action was being taken to reduce its carbon
footprint.246
G. The New Generation of Environmental Claims: Carbon
Neutrality and Offsets
1.

Current Review of the Green Guides

In 2007, the FTC acknowledged that new advertising terminology was
becoming commonplace and began reevaluating its guidelines with a series
of public workshops.247 “The FTC specifically asked whether the Green
Guides should be modified to include guidance regarding . . . claims invoking the phrases ‘renewable energy’ and ‘carbon offset.’”248 At an April
2008 workshop, FTC Chairman William Kovacic stated that the FTC’s
goal was to ensure that consumers maintain confidence in the truthfulness
of advertising claims in an age of changing “social norms” and industry
development.249 John Kalkowski noted that he is hearing more and more
terms that were “not even in our lexicon a few years ago.”250 At a January
2008 workshop, the FTC specifically discussed the increasing focus of ad-

244. See Press Release, The Carbon Trust, High Street Failing on Footprinting, Say Consumers (June 2009), http://www.carbon-label.com/news/16.06.09.pdf; see also O’ Neill, supra note 162, at 424 (explaining that the first product to display the Carbon Reduction Label
was Walker’s Cheese and Onion Crisps).
245. James Murray, Tesco Defends Carbon Label Scheme, BUSINESSGREEN (May 21,
2008), http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2217167/tesco-defends-carbonlabel.
246. See Press Release, The Carbon Trust, supra note 244.
247. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869-70.
248. Gibson, supra note 35, at 430; see also Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 870
(stating that the FTC is now considering whether to amend the Green Guides to include carbon offsets).
249. William Kovacic, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed.
Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Green Packaging Claims 17 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf.
250. John Kalkowski, Editor, Packaging Digest Mag., Remarks at the Fed. Trade
Comm’n’s Workshop on Green Packaging Claims 23 (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf.

FLIEGELMAN_CHRISTENSEN

2010]

THE NEXT GENERATION OF GREENWASH

10/13/2010 6:52 PM

1031

vertisement on a product’s carbon footprint,251 claims of carbon neutrality,252 and carbon offset reduction.253
Although the revised Green Guides were supposed to be released in
April 2009, the FTC still has not released any revisions or updates.254 The
FTC released a notice that it is considering “conducting its own study related to consumer perception of environmental marketing claims”255 to
“compare participant responses regarding the meaning of different environmental marketing claims.”256 At the June 2009 House of Energy and
Commerce subcommittee on Trade and Consumer Protection, Kohm explained that though the workshops resulted in useful information and response, the FTC obtained little information about how consumers understand certain claims.257 He stated that the FTC “plans to conduct its own
research,” but had no anticipated release date for the revisions.258
2.

The New Terminology: Carbon Neutrality and Carbon Offsets

Carbon has become increasingly prominent both in product labeling and
advertisements for consumers to purchase goods that offset individuals’
carbon footprints.259 In the United States, sixty percent of an individual’s
carbon footprint is attributable to one’s goods and services purchases; thus,
the “impetus for carbon labels is that by providing consumers with information about the carbon content of a product, they will be able to make informed decisions about the goods they purchase and ultimately choose
products with a smaller carbon footprint.”260 Despite concerns of consum-

251. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 254-79 and accompanying text.
254. See generally It’s Too Easy Being Green: Defining Fair Green Marketing Practices:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of James Kohm, Dir. Enforcement Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter It’s Too Easy Being Green].
255. Agency Information Collection Activities, 74 Fed. Reg. 90,396 (Fed. Trade
Comm’n May 11, 2009).
256. Id.
257. See It’s Too Easy Being Green, supra note 254.
258. Id. at 4-5.
259. See Woods, supra note 15, at 83; see also Majoras, supra note 3, at 13 (“The term
‘carbon neutral’ has received a lot of attention.”); O’Neill, supra note 162, at 422; SavastaKennedy, supra note 197, at 851-52 (“Anyone who has booked online an airline flight, a
hotel room, or rented a car in the last few years has had the opportunity to ‘offset’ the
greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution . . . by investing in a carbon offset.”); Federal Trade
Commission Webcast of Workshop Examining Market for Carbon Offsets, ENVTL. EVALUATION ORG. (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.envirovaluation.org/index.php/2008/01/14/ [hereinafter Webcast].
260. O’Neill, supra note 162, at 396.
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er confusion, “[t]he sale of carbon offsets . . . if marketed truthfully, can
provide interested consumers the opportunity to participate in this market . .
. that may reduce emissions.”261
Many products bear a “carbon-neutral” label, which is accomplished by
offsetting the carbon emissions.262 A carbon offset displaces or sequesters
greenhouse gas emissions in one location to compensate for the emissions
that occur at another source location.263 The cost of a carbon offset program should be directed to “alternative energy development and sustainability initiatives.”264 Yet, most consumers lack real awareness of the actual
definition of a carbon offset.265 For example, a survey conducted by the
Shelton Group asked consumers to place a check next to any true statement
about carbon dioxide and forty-nine percent incorrectly answered that carbon dioxide depletes the ozone layer.266 Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for consumers to verify purchases of carbon offsets because the offsetting generally occurs away from the consumers.267 According to the
former FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras, “with this much uncertainty,
there’s a heightened potential for deception.”268
The number of products labeled carbon neutral continues to expand rapidly. For example, the TESCO supermarket launched a program in April
2008 with carbon neutral labels on products such as potatoes, aiming to
“footprint” five hundred products.269 In 2010, TESCO made headlines by
opening its first “zero carbon store as part of its bid to be a carbon neutral

261. Majoras, supra note 3, at 13-14.
262. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 852 (noting that there are carbon neutral
football games, baby showers, computer companies and a variety of other products).
263. See Comments to the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Carbon Offset Workshop Comment Project No. P074207, OFFSET QUALITY INITIATIVE, Jan. 25, 2008, at 3; see
also Woods, supra note 15, at 85 (“Carbon offsets do just what their name suggests: They
permit individuals or businesses to emit greenhouse gases at their current rates, but mitigate
that pollution by paying to create or improve upon clean energy technology in other locations.”).
264. Woods, supra note 15, at 85.
265. Even more educated consumers may believe a manufacturer is producing less carbon emissions when there actually may be no on-site mitigation of the emissions; instead,
off-site reduction provides a less costly way to reduce carbon emissions. See id. at 85-86.
266. Green Consumers Worried About the Economy, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Aug.
27, 2009), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/18776.
267. See Majoras, supra note 3, at 14; Woods, supra note 15, at 85.
268. Majoras, supra note 3, at 15.
269. Alistair Driver, Tesco’s New Carbon Footprint Label, FARMERS GUARDIAN, Aug.
28, 2009, at 5.
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company by 2050.”270 Other available carbon neutral products include
carbon neutral clothing,271 a carbon neutral cell phone,272 carbon neutral
printing equipment,273 carbon neutral quinoa,274 carbon neutral sugar,275
and even carbon negative bottled water.276
The carbon offsets themselves have similarly become prominent products in environmental advertising. Currently, major corporations such as
Dell, Continental Airlines, General Electric, and Bank of America advertise
to consumers that they can purchase carbon offsets for a variety of products
to decrease their carbon footprints.277 Dell, for example, allows consumers
to purchase offsets on computer purchases; Bank of America allows credit
card reward points to be used towards a carbon offset purchase.278
More recently, voluntary offset markets have advertised carbon offsets
for direct sale to individual consumers.279 Since 2002, the global market
for voluntary offsets has increased over one hundred fifty percent.280 In

270. Julia Finch, Tesco Opens Its First Zero Carbon Store, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 2,
2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/02/tesco-carbon-neutral-greenbuilding.
271. See Carbon Neutral Clothing Certification Standards, CARBON NEUTRAL CLOTHING,
http://www.carbonneutralclothing.com (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
272. See Press Release, Motorola, Motorola Unveils First Mobile Phone Made Using Recycled Water Bottle Plastics (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://mediacenter.motorola.com/
Content/Detail.aspx?ReleaseID=10464&NewsAreaID=2. The phone, called the “MOTO
W233 Renew,” is considered “carbon-neutral” by Motorola because it “offsets the carbon
dioxide required to manufacture, distribute and operate the phone through investments in
renewable energy sources and reforestation.” Id.
273. See New Zealand’s First Carbon Neutral Office Company, RICOH, Aug. 3, 2009, at
1, available at http://www.ricoh.co.nz/about/environment/rnz_c0.pdf; About Ricoh, “Plant
a Tree in Africa Program,” RICOH, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ricoh.com/
environment/report/pdf2007/11_12.pdf.
274. See Christina Clark, Alter Eco Offers Fair Trade Goodies, GREEN DAILY (Nov. 20,
2008),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gyCICXEjeMQJ:wwww.
greendaily.com/tag/food/+christina+clark+green+daily+alter+eco&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&
gl=us&client=safari.
275. See Introducing Domino Sugar Carbon Free, DOMINO SUGAR (2009), http://www.
dominosugar.com/carbonfree/.
276. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Fiji Water Vows to Go Carbon Negative, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 2007, at Business 3.
277. See Webcast, supra note 259.
278. See id.
279. What You Can Do: Go Carbon Neutral, DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, http://www.
davidsuzuki.org/what-you-can-do/reduce-your-carbon-footprint/go-carbon-neutral/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION] (detailing a list of companies
that provide carbon offsets for air travel, vehicles, home electricity, gas, and general vendors).
280. See Jackie Crosby & Karen Youso, Can We Buy Our Way to a Greener World?,
STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 2, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.mepartnership.org/mep_
pressroom.asp?new_id=2257.
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2007 alone, corporations and individual consumers in the United States
spent more than $54 million dollars on carbon offsets to balance emissions
created by their energy-producing activities.281 “Trade in carbon offset
credits is estimated to be more than $100 million a year” and is expected to
continue expanding.282 “That number represents a threefold increase in
value from 2006.”283 Consumers are experiencing difficulty interpreting
express or implied claims about the environmental benefits of offsets as
well as how to verify these purchases.284 Because these offsets are purchased in a voluntary market without any federal regulation, consumers
should “[p]roceed with caution,” because without “more government oversight, it’s a case of buyer beware for consumers.”285
3.

The Carbon Offset Market in the United States

Although there is no overarching federal regulatory program, there are
two types of carbon markets in the United States: the Chicago Climate Exchange and the voluntary carbon market.286 The Chicago Climate Exchange is a cap-and-trade system where members voluntarily commit to reducing their emissions and can trade emissions or purchase offsets to
achieve their emissions goals.287 In contrast, the voluntary carbon market
is individuals and a wide range of companies purchasing carbon offsets
without a formal exchange program.288 All retail transactions made by in-

281. See Lynn L. Bergeson, Green Marketing Claims: FTC Enters the Fray, BNP MEDIA,
Nov. 1, 2008, at 15.
282. Tracy Heinzmand & Hugh Latimer, Understanding the Carbon Footprint, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/
documents/pu698.pdf.
283. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 852; see also Kate Hamilton, Carbon Project
Manager, Ecosystem Marketplace, Remarks at the Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 34 (Jan. 8, 2008), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/transcript/session1.pdf (“Ecosystem Marketplace decided to start tracking this [carbon offset] market . . . . [T]he market grew rapidly between
2005 and 2006.”).
284. See K. Russell LaMotte, Re: Carbon Offset Workshop, CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS
COAL., Jan. 25, 2008, at 2.
285. Crosby & Youso, supra note 280.
286. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 33; see also Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at
861-62. For further discussion on voluntary markets, see ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE &
NEW CARBON FINANCE, FORGING A FRONTIER: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS
2008, at 17-19 (2008).
287. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 33.
288. See id.; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 862 (discussing that participants in the
voluntary carbon market include individuals and organizations interested in offsetting their
carbon emissions and that the carbon market consists of a wide range of transactions).
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dividuals in the United States take place in the voluntary market.289 Among
carbon offset retailers, the most common method is using their own standard for determining carbon offsets, followed by use of the “Voluntary
Carbon Standard.”290
Manufacturers and consumers have described the voluntary market for
offsetting emissions as a means by which individuals can address climate
change.291 Industry representatives assert that it is “an easy to way to take
responsibility for the greenhouse gas emissions we create . . . .”292 A report
by Standard Life Investments on carbon management and neutrality, however, warns that carbon offset programs “have the capacity to disguise the
failure to achieve actual reductions in overall greenhouse gas emissions.”293
For example, Dell announced it had achieved carbon neutrality, but failed
to include any specific information about its oil use, use of fuel for product
shipping, or electricity needed to operate its product.294 Yet, “[c]onsumers
looking to buy a computer might mistakenly conclude that Dell’s announced carbon neutrality means that buying a Dell computer will not contribute to climate change.”295
Currently, there are two main standards for calculating greenhouse gas
emissions: the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)296 and the PAS 2050.297
The PAS 2050 specifies requirements for assessing the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of products from organizations that supply goods and
services and calculate their carbon footprint.298 Similarly, the VCS sets
standards for greenhouse gas emissions reductions using “verifiers” to conduct independent tests to determine emissions using a specified methodology.299
289. See LaMotte, supra note 284.
290. Hamilton, supra note 283, at 40.
291. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 853.
292. DAVID SUZUKI FOUNDATION, supra note 279.
293. The Carbon Neutral Myth, CARBON TRADE WATCH, Feb. 2007, at 6, available at
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/pubs/carbon_neutral_myth.pdf (citing CARBON MANAGEMENT & CARBON NEUTRALITY, STANDARD LIFE INVESTMENTS, July 2006, available at
http://uk.standardlifeinvestments.com/content/pdf/sli/CO-CarbonNeutralityReport.pdf).
294. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 854-55.
295. Id. at 855.
296. See The Voluntary Carbon Standard, VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD (2008),
http://v-c-s.org/.
297. See PAS 2050: Assessing the Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Goods and
Services, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (2010), http://www.bsigroup.com/en/Standardsand-Publications/How-we-can-help-you/Professional-Standards-Service/PAS-2050/.
298. PAS 2050, BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (2009), http://shop.bsigroup.com/en/
Browse-by-Sector/Energy--Utilities/PAS-2050/.
299. Frequently Asked Questions, VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD (2008), http://v-c-s.
org/faq.html#question11.
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Like general environmental third-party certification programs, there are
private certification companies that provide certification and eco-labels
specifically to carbon offset providers.300 However, a product bearing a
green label does not necessarily inform a consumer what criteria the thirdparty company uses to determine certification. For example, a bottle may
displaying an environmental seal for renewable energy because its product
label was printed in a renewable-energy facility, not necessarily because
that the bottle and its contents were separately manufactured using renewable energy.301 Since consumers are already less knowledgeable about the
meaning of carbon offsets,302 the lack of information can further increase
consumer confusion.
II. PROPOSALS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING REGULATIONS
Part II explores potential proposals for improving environmental advertising regulations and who should take charge in their implementation.
First, Part II will discuss the various criticisms of the Green Guides that
have launched a movement for reform, both inside the FTC and from external sources. Next, it will examine the benefits and disadvantages of a
pure, privately operated certification system, compared to those of a government model in which a federal agency would be primarily responsible
for developing standards and providing certification. Finally, this section
explores the possibility of a public-private hybrid model in which the government and private sector jointly collaborate to devise standards, create an
eco-labeling program, and enforce advertising regulations.
A.

Criticisms of the Green Guides

Since the adoption of the Green Guides in 1992, they have been subject
to criticism and proposals for reform.303 Although modified in 1996, the
revisions failed to address the major critiques of the Guides.304 The five
most common criticism of the guides are: (1) the guidelines are voluntary
and thus do not have the force of law; (2) the guidelines provide extremely
vague definitions and lack the specificity needed for scientific terminology;

300. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 866.
301. Green Packaging Workshop Comment Project No. P084200, CTR. FOR RES. SOLUTIONS, Apr. 11, 2008, at 3.
302. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
303. See Woods, supra note 15, at 81.
304. See Robert B. White, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325, 335-36 (2010); see also Lauren C. Avallone,
Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
685, 686 (2006).
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(3) because the guidelines are voluntary, they do not preempt state regulations which prevents a uniform standard; (4) the guidelines have failed to
provide effective monitoring and enforcement; and (5) the terminology in
outdated and does not reflect current environmental marketing trends.305
1.

Non-Binding Regulations

Although the FTC has the authority to promulgate binding guidelines
under Section 5 of the FTCA, the Green Guides only put forth voluntary
principles for “guidance of the public.”306 Proponents have argued that the
Green Guides should be given the force of law to increase their effectiveness.307 Because the guidelines are voluntary, the FTC has failed to investigate many dubious environmental advertisements.308 For voluntary
guidelines, the FTC is required to prove in each case that the practice in
question would violate the standard provisions of the FTCA.309 As a result,
the FTC must expend significant resources in each enforcement action and
has thus prosecuted only the most visible and egregious violators.310 If the
guidelines were binding, any misleading advertisement would automatically constitute a violation.311 Binding regulations could potentially maximize
industry compliance by providing greater information to manufacturers and
holding them accountable to consistent standards.312 Companies would be
cognizant that any misleading or deceptive advertisement would result in
actual consequences.313 Furthermore, it would reduce transaction costs,
which would permit more frequent enforcement and, in turn, broader deterrence of misleading advertising.314 Since misleading statements can generate substantial confusion among consumers thereby depriving them of opportunities to reward manufacturers marketing environmentally superior
products, without binding regulations, universal compliance and selfregulation is unlikely.315

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See Avallone, supra note 304, at 686.
16 C.F.R. § 260.1 (1996).
See Avallone, supra note 304, at 690-91; Gibson, supra note 35, at 434.
Heather Green, How Green Is That Gizmo?, BUS. WK., Dec. 20, 2007, at 36.
Grodsky, supra note 83, at 159; Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61.
310. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 159; Green, supra note 308.
311. See Gibson, supra note 35, at 434.
312. See id. (“Such automatic liability would provide a strong incentive to comply with
the Green Guides.”).
313. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 169; see also Gibson, supra note 35, at 434.
314. See Gibson, supra note 35, at 434.
315. See id.
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Vagueness in the Guidelines

The standards and terminology defined in the Green Guides are vague
primarily because they are not based on scientific technology,316 but rather
on how the FTC believes the advertisement will affect a consumer’s decision making.317 As a result, manufacturers have often complained that they
fail to provide “clear rules on what they may or may not claim about their
products. Instead, manufacturers are left to interpret the definitions and examples in assessing whether their claims are valid.”318
Since the current guidelines do not require specificity in advertising,
manufacturers frequently use short slogans to characterize a product’s environmental characteristics.319 Such brevity is often “achieved at the expense
of clarity.”320 Vague claims, like “green” or “environmentally friendly”
have become the common method of describing a product with some beneficial environmental aspect, but when used in product labeling, the terms
often do not reflect the harmful effects or tradeoff a product may have or
any scientific analysis.321 Proponents of specific standards thus argue that
any future environmental regulations should provide definitions that are as
specific as possible, “directing advertisers to make precise claims about the
ingredients or environmental effects of their products [because] [v]ague
standards are inadequate for creating meaningful distinctions among product labels.”322
The lack of specificity particularly impacts carbon product labeling.
Currently, there is no industry consensus for baseline minimum standards
to verify carbon offsets.323 There are ten certification standards in the
United States that are specifically used for carbon certification.324 This has
raised concerns of consumer confusion and the potential for fraud325 because each label has different standards or definitions.326 A consumer has

316. See Woods, supra note 15, at 78.
317. See id.
318. Avallone, supra note 304, at 692.
319. See Luehr, supra note 2, at 316.
320. Id.
321. See id. at 320-21; see also supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
322. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 166; see also Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 377;
Downs, supra note 2, at 168.
323. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869.
324. See id. at 876; Eric Carlson, Executive Director, Carbonfund.org, Remarks at Federal Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates 222
(Jan. 8, 2008) (“We don’t have a lack of standards in the industry. We have a huge number
of standards . . . .”).
325. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 869.
326. See id.
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no say in which protocol is used and is likely unaware of the distinctions
between certified protocols.327 Narrowing the field from ten diverse certifications to one uniform standard would create a way to verify a set group
of offset attributes.328
The Carbon Offset Providers Coalition, comprised of leading companies
in the carbon offset market,329 has recognized that the terminology’s complexity is challenging the decision-making ability of consumers.330 The
Coalition states that consumers have a “need to know and understand the
‘content’ of what they are buying,” which is best accomplished by requiring that the relevant information be available.331 While products claiming
carbon-neutrality state that information may not be available at the point of
sale, the Coalition suggests making the information available to consumers
through a publicly-accessible registrar.332 This could include specific components of a product as well as easily accessible definitions of the terms
used in a product claim. Thus, the Coalition proposes that the FTC identify
the information required by a consumer and have it compiled so consumers
can more easily substantiate product claims.333 Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, a private combination of natural gas and electric utilities in the
United States, also submitted a comment to the FTC suggesting that the
FTC establish “consistent parameters for voluntary carbon offset programs
. . . .”334 Similarly, Consumers Union suggests that carbon offset and renewable energy terms made in advertising or product claims “require scope
and specific definition provided by the FTC.”335 Consumers Union argues
that not only should the terminology have specific definitions, but also that
companies should be required to provide disclosures on specific actions,
such as whether the offsets are direct or indirect by specifying the type of
offset action taken to reduce marketplace deception.336

327. See id.
328. See id. at 876.
329. See LaMotte, supra note 284, at Exhibit 1.
330. See id. at 4.
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 4-5.
334. Carbon Offset Workshop—Comment, Project No. P074207, PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO.,
Jan. 8, 2008, at 1.
335. Letter from Urvashi Rangan, Senior Scientist & Policy Analyst, Consumers Union,
to Hampton Newsome, Fed. Trade Comm’n 1 (Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-00026.pdf.
336. See id. at 1-2.
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Federal Preemption of State Standards

Because the guidelines are non-binding, they do not preempt states’ individual regulations.337 The result has been a lack of national uniformity in
environmental regulations.338 Though several states have used the Guides
as a model when enacting regulation, other states have created stricter standards and more precise definitions to combat the perceived leniency of the
Green Guides.339 The standards and definitions, however, vary vastly
among the states. For example, California, New York, and Rhode Island
each define “recycled” differently.340
The current lack of uniformity, as a consequence of the state-by-state enforcement approach, has created difficulties both for lawmakers and manufacturers.341 Federal lawmakers and the FTC have greater difficulty holding manufacturers accountable for violations.342 The FTC cannot only
consider whether a manufacturer has violated the Green Guides, but must
also consider whether a manufacturer has violated the more specific requirements implemented by that state.343
Furthermore, manufacturers incur greater costs from this patchwork of
standards, which can prevent advertiser compliance.344 These include direct costs like printing new labels for each state and indirect costs such as
maintaining two or more product inventories and imposing separate distribution and record-keeping requirements for each state.345 Manufacturers
must also monitor up to fifty independent standards, which requires substantial time and money to ensure awareness of and compliance with each
state’s current laws.346 This can particularly burden smaller companies
who may lack the resources to monitor the variations.347 Companies may
be unable to provide environmental information about their products without fearing legal repercussions based on a state’s individual practice.348

337. See Woods, supra note 15, at 82.
338. See id.
339. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 689-90.
340. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 164.
341. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 686.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See Grodsky, supra note 83, at 164.
345. See David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State
Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1003 (1993).
346. See id. (“Without uniform standards, the costs involved in marketing products to
different states can make it virtually impossible for honest manufacturers to provide environmental information.”).
347. See id. at 1003-04.
348. See id. at 1004.
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Federal preemption of state regulations has been suggested to create national uniformity and remedy the issues created by the state-by-state approach.349 Proponents believe that “federal preemption is ultimately necessary to ensure that the law . . . is both clear and consistent.”350 For new
technology, where the market is largely unregulated, the Offset Quality Initiative, a collaborative group of environmental non-profit organizations,
actually “recommends the establishment of a centralized oversight and enforcement agency that would be tasked with ensuring the accuracy.”351
Opponents of preemption argue that preempting state standards to create
uniformity would inappropriately mix environmental and advertising policy.352 They argue that the federal regulations fail to impose sufficiently
strict regulations and federal preemption would be a “foolhardy” example
of “paternal[ism].”353 States “have an incentive to go beyond any minimum federal standards because they want to be recognized as leaders in
high profile fields like environmental regulation.” 354 For example, “when
FTC Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga asked a New York state official
whether New York would change its ‘recyclable’ standard to meet FTC
guidelines . . . [t]he officer stated that New York would certainly continue
to ‘be creative’ with regulatory approaches if the federal government established merely a regulatory floor.”355
Specifically for carbon offsets, opponents advise against creating a uniform standard because there are substantial differences among professionals for carbon calculations, such as the underlying basis for measurement
and verification.356 Others argue, however, that the proliferation of standards has caused consumer confusion and a uniform certification standard
would address the issue of consumer protection.357 To compromise in the
debate between federal and state powers, one suggestion has been to create
a federal program that supplants state definitions, but allows states to

349. See id. at 1015.
350. Id. at 994-95; see also Avallone, supra note 304, at 697.
351. Alexia Kelly, Comments to the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Carbon Offset Workshop Comment, Project No. P074207, OFFSET QUALITY INITIATIVE, Jan. 25, 2008,
at 13, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-00047.pdf.
352. See Church, supra note 23, at 322.
353. Id.
354. Welsh, supra note 345, at 1021.
355. Id. at 1021-22.
356. Wiley Barbour, Dir., Envtl. Res. Trust, Remarks at Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Workshop
on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates (Jan. 8, 2008); see also Kelly, supra
note 351, at 4 (describing the three most common methods for determining the additionality
component of a carbon offset project).
357. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 867.
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promulgate certain laws that go beyond the federally created minimum
standards.358
4.

Lack of Enforcement of the Green Guides

Since 2000, the FTC has brought only three enforcement actions for violation of the Green Guides.359 Each of these actions was announced the
same day FTC Chairman James Kohm appeared before the House of Representatives in a subcommittee hearing on the problems in environmental
advertising.360 Since then, the only FTC action taken against greenwashing
has been a warning letter to seventy-eight businesses requiring them to alter
advertising and label practices for bamboo-based clothing, traditionally
considered eco-friendly, but in fact made from chemically processed
rayon.361 Even when companies are found to have violated the Green
Guides, they are subject to limited sanctions, which generally amount to an
agreement to discontinue the warning and a broad cease-and-desist order
prohibiting future misleading claims.362
The lack of enforcement has been attributed to the FTC’s case-by case
enforcement approach.363 “Since the 1970s, the FTC has prosecuted misleading environmental advertising on a case-by-case basis.”364 Prior to the
adoption of the Green Guides, the NAAG, the EPA, and the National Advertising Division (“NAD”) all criticized the ineffectiveness of the FTC’s
enforcement.365 The NAAG described it as “too ponderous to allow swift
reaction to the emergence of new marketing strategies.”366 A group of
manufacturers also criticized the approach, “explaining that until the
Commission issues national green marketing guidelines, the states will en-

358. See Welsh, supra note 345, at 1020-21.
359. News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Actions Against Kmart, Tender and Dyna-E Alleging Deceptive ‘Biodegradable’ Claims (June 9, 2009), available at
www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/kmart.shtm.
360. See id.
361. See FTC Warns Marketers Not to ‘Bamboozle’ Consumers with Misleading Biodegradable or Green Claims, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Mar. 1, 2010, available at http://www.
thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=220021209.
362. See Woods, supra note 15, at 81-82.
363. See Israel, supra note 58, at 318; Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 870 (“[G]iven
the enforcement limitations of the Green Guides, FTC’s involvement will not supplant the
need for a uniform certification standard.”).
364. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 154. Examples include actions against Ex-Cell-O Corporation in 1973, Standard Oil of California in 1974, cases in the 1980s against air and water
filter companies, and American Enviro Products for advertising that Bunnies Disposable
Diapers degraded rapidly in landfills. See id. at 154-55.
365. See Israel, supra note 58, at 318.
366. Id.
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force the law in an inconsistent manner and manufacturers will not be certain that their green claims comply with the law.”367
Further contributing to the FTC’s lack of enforcement is the FTC’s unwillingness to pursue any action that might be seen as creating environmental policy.368 The FTC has been hesitant to take an active role, many scholars have been left “wondering ‘why shouldn’t environmental marketing
claims be regulated like all others . . . .’”369 At the FTC’s January 2008
workshop, FTC Chairman Majoras stated that despite the Commission’s
intent to explore these scientific issues, she “want[ed] to make clear that
[the FTC] [does not] . . . have the authority or the technical expertise to address issues of environmental or energy regulation.”370 During recent congressional hearings in July 2009, James Kohm reiterated that any marketing
modifications must avoid “set[ting] environmental standards or policy,”
because the Commission’s only purpose is to “protect[] consumers from
unfair or deceptive practices.”371
A major problem with the case-by-case approach is that “it fails to demarcate clear boundaries between deceptive and permissible practices [because] [c]ase-by-case adjudication by the FTC is selective, incremental,
and highly contextual.”372 The continuing “surge of unsubstantiated and
misleading green marketing claims” has proven that the case-by-case approach has not provided ample deterrence toward deceptive advertising
practices.373
5.

Outdated Terminology: The Need for Current Environmental
Regulation

With the emergence of new technology and new terminology, the Green
Guides have been criticized for being “simply out of touch with current environmental marketing realities.”374 FTC Chairman Majoras has admitted
that the guides are outdated because, since their last revision in 1998, there
has been increased use of environmental terminology and “terms like sustainable, bio-based, cradle to cradle, and carbon neutral” have been intro-

367. Id.
368. See News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 359.
369. Hoch & Franz, supra note 86, at 443; see also Steven W. Colford, FTC Confronts
Green Muddle, ADVERTISING AGE, July 22, 1991, at 4.
370. Majoras, supra note 3, at 16.
371. News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 359 (discussing testimony presented
by James Kohm, Dir. Enforcement Div., Fed. Trade Comm’n).
372. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 155.
373. See id.
374. Woods, supra note 15, at 83.
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duced.375 “A decade-long drought in revisions means that more recent
technologies and advertising terms are largely unregulated, including carbon offsets, renewable energy certificates, and green building products.”376
The terms “carbon-neutral” and “carbon offset” have become particularly prominent.377 For many consumers, buying a carbon neutral product is
“more like a symbolic act than . . . an act of consumption” to show that a
consumer’s buying power can make an environmental impact.378 General
proponents of specific scientific definitions argue that whichever government agency takes the reins, the latest terminology of carbon neutrality
needs to be addressed in any future updates or regulations. The Carbon
Offset Providers Coalition similarly believes that the FTC or a governmental agency should establish guidelines for the use of certain terminology
that is used in voluntary carbon markets.379
Proponents further argue that monitoring the effects of carbon offset
projects, the responsible distribution of carbon offset funds, and continued
monitoring of advertising claims should all play substantial roles in developing a regulatory scheme for the carbon offset market.380 However, the
difficulty in enforcing the accuracy of such claims is determining whether
the advertising claim has met the required substantiation, especially at a
time when the very meaning of “carbon offset” is still very much open to
debate.381 If experts have not even reached a consensus on the means to
define carbon neutrality and carbon offsets, the concern is that “consumers
have no consistent information upon which to form opinions about carbon
offsets.”382 One proposal is that to facilitate the verifiability of these
claims, companies claiming a product has certain attributes must keep a
record of the data for substantiation.383

375. Majoras, supra note 3, at 11.
376. Woods, supra note 15, at 83.
377. Id. at 84. For example, the New Oxford American Dictionary added the word “carbon neutral” and named it the “2006 Word of the Year.” Carbon Neutral: Oxford Word of
the Year, OUPBLOG (Nov. 13, 2006, 08:30 EST), http://blog.oup.com/2006/11/carbon_
neutral_/.
378. Levy, supra note 21, at 66; see also Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 853
(“Consumers of offsets . . . [are] voluntarily seeking to green up their act . . . . [They] are
seemingly driven by a sense of environmental responsibility.”).
379. See LaMotte, supra note 284, at 5.
380. See Woods, supra note 15, at 86-87.
381. Id. at 86.
382. Id. at 87.
383. See Coffee, supra note 94, at 354.
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Private Environmental Certifications

Under a purely private model, third-party certification programs would
continue to be the sole method of certification for environmental labeling in
the United States. Proponents of free market regulation advocate that an
industry consensus will develop over time regarding the criteria for environmental seals.384 For example, in the carbon labeling market, the Voluntary Carbon Standard has emerged as the most frequently used certification
methodology.385 Recently, Green-e Climate, a voluntary certification program based in the California, has created its own popular and independent
carbon offset standards for emissions sold in the voluntary market.386 Despite their prominent use, there are still over ten carbon certification programs that are used in the United States alone, each with its own criteria,
and Green-e Climate’s popularity indicates that other standards will continue to emerge.387 Thus, at present, “market stakeholders have not yet
reached consensus on a particular standard or protocol,” and the varying
standards can exacerbate consumer confusion.388
Advocates of self-regulation have highlighted the success of the NAD’s
industry enforcement program. One of the most effective means for consumers to combat false advertising has been by filing a complaint with the
NAD of the Council of Better Business Bureaus.389 The NAD is the advertising industry’s self regulating forum and provides for a formal adjudication of claims against false advertisers; it focuses on national cases involving consumer deception, maintains a strict confidentiality policy, and will
not deal with cases that are pending or subject to federal agency action.390
The NAD process is voluntary; however, they have been aggressive in pursuing actions against false advertising regarding green products.391 While
participation in the process is technically voluntary, because of its reputa-

384. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 40.
385. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 879.
386. Adam Stern, TerraPass Comments to the Federal Trade Commission Re: Carbon
Offset Workshop, Project No. P074207, TERRAPASS, Jan. 25, 2008, at 6, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-00045.pdf; Green-e Climate
Overview, GREEN-E (2010), http://www.green-e.org/getcert_ghg_intro.shtml.
387. See Who’s Deciding What’s Green, ECO LABELING ORGANIZATION, http://thegreen
pages.ca/portal/ca/2008/01/ecolabellingorg_whos_deciding.html (last visited Aug. 13,
2010).
388. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 879.
389. See Dillard, supra note 75, at 33.
390. See id.
391. See Eric DeJong et al., Green Policies: Understanding and Addressing Compliance
Risks, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
article.asp?articleid=84934.
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tion in the industry, “filing with this organization could be the most important part of any action against a false advertiser.”392
The benefit of third-party certification, proponents claim, is that these
evaluations lower the cost of guaranteeing truthfulness in advertising.393
These high costs occur under a government model in which a federal agency must monitor and regulate the accuracy of all claims. The rationale is
that the consumers will determine which products are best without the expense of governmental interference.394 Private certifiers can spread the
cost of developing criteria, producing evaluations from consumers, and
conducting large scale testing of products, all of which would amount to
lower costs for consumers.395 Private program proponents believe that “the
government should intervene in the market only when evidence of systematic market failure exists.”396 When deceptive advertising is unregulated,
it can result in a misallocation of resources, but “market failure alone
[should] not necessarily justify government intervention.”397
Critics of private regulation argue that the free market has created a system of environmental seals that are granted for monetary exchange, which
“invite[s] the possibility of bribery or improper influence.”398 Manufacturers can choose from almost three-hundred environmental labels in order to
place a green stamp of approval on their products, ten of which are specifically for carbon labeling.399 While many of these labels have standardized
criteria and independent verification, some do not due to high cost and lack
of manpower.400 Thus, critics argue that for carbon offsets especially, the
“[c]ertification can only be as good as the standard is that it certifies by.”401
Manufacturers are adopting differing standards for determining carbon
offsets, often using their own methodology for the calculation.402 As a result, carbon offset purchases are generally a “scattered range of transac-

392. Dillard, supra note 75, at 34.
393. See Church, supra note 23, at 287-88.
394. See id. at 287.
395. See id. at 288.
396. Id. at 320.
397. Id.
398. Downs, supra note 2, at 173.
399. See Who’s Deciding What’s Green, supra note 387.
400. See Gwendolyn Bounds, As Eco Seals Proliferate, So Do Doubts, WALL ST. J., Apr.
2, 2009, at D1.
401. Anja Kollmus, Carbon Markets Scientist, U.S. Center of the Stockholm Env’t Inst.,
Remarks at the Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy
Certificates (Jan. 8, 2008), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/
agenda.pdf.
402. See Hamilton, supra note 283, at 40.
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tions,” described as a “wild west” or “buyer beware market.”403 One concern with differing standards is, “what if [the] calculations or assumptions
about environmental friendliness are wrong . . . ?”404 Though private, voluntary certification has the potential to create an effective eco-labeling
system, the industry seemingly has failed to police itself.405 Instead, it has
chosen to take advantage of the profitable trade-off of “green,” without sacrificing or changing current manufacturing practices.406 Despite attempts
to establish awareness, education, and credibility, private certifications
have instead become known for extensive greenwashing.407
C.

The “Command and Control” Approach: A Purely Governmental
Option

“Under a command and control regulatory approach,” a government
agency alone would be responsible for developing and enforcing environmental advertising standards.408 Although the federal agency can delegate
authority to a subcommittee within the agency or state agencies, the role of
the private sector and general public is limited to self-reporting incidents.409
A strictly governmental program could “offer advantages . . . of credibility, accountability, and . . . technical expertise.”410 For example, it would
eliminate the multitude of private certification companies, as well as concerns of bribery or reduced standards during the certification process.411
However, a strictly government-operated program also poses several disadvantages. Maria Kennedy, a professor specializing in environmental law,
advises that “[g]iven the unique nature of the carbon offset market, strict
adherence to a traditional command and control approach with limited opportunities for stakeholder input in the creation of a uniform certification
standard for offset projects is not ideal.”412 First, it would not allow for local solutions to address local problems because federal law would preempt

403. Id. at 34.
404. Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Remarks at Fed.
Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and Renewable Energy Certificates (Jan. 8,
2008), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/agenda.pdf.
405. See supra notes 23-24, 34-37, 397-400 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 23-24, 48-50 and accompanying text.
407. See Goff, supra note 39.
408. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 882.
409. See id. at 877 (“[T]he traditional command and control regulatory approach creates a
very limited role for market participants . . . .”).
410. Grodsky, supra note 83, at 206.
411. See id.
412. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 878.
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individual state practices.413 Additionally, it would create huge administrative overhead costs to independently test products and provide certification
to companies. Particularly in the area of carbon offsets, administrative delay would be particularly problematic because these “rely on timely certification in order to attract funding sources.”414
D.

A Joint Agency Framework

To combine the experience of the FTC and EPA, one suggestion is a
joint agency approach in creating and enforcing environmental advertising
regulations.415 One prominent proposal is for the EPA to create the voluntary standards and technical definitions for the use of environmental marketing claims, which would then be enforced by both the FTC and the
EPA.416 While the guidelines are considered a “helpful addition,” many
commentators believe the EPA should create the regulations because it
“has more experience and qualifications.”417 This would create a system
with mandatory adherence to environmental marketing regulations and
technical-based definitions to give guidance to manufacturers, and “may
even encourage the development of more ecologically-minded production
strategies and techniques that permit the company to boast even greater environmental benefits.”418
III. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CARBON
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING REGULATIONS
Part III of this Note proposes instituting binding environmental advertising regulations and a voluntary carbon eco-labeling program that utilizes
the advantages of both the government and private sector. This model
should address the deficiencies in the Green Guides by creating a binding,
uniform standard of regulations with definitions based on scientific expertise that still provide sufficient flexibility for rapidly evolving technology.
It would also create a voluntary carbon eco-labeling program that would
413. See Coffee, supra note 94, at 346.
414. Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 883.
415. See Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 172-76; Coffee, supra note 94, at 346; Woods,
supra note 15, at 90; see also Downs, supra note 2, at 182-83 (“MOUs intended to advance
cooperative executive branch oversight and regulation of green marketing would surely be
an improvement . . . .”); Gibson, supra note 35, at 437 (“The FTC and the EPA need each
other in order to effectively reach their respective goals . . . .”).
416. See Avallone, supra note 304, at 692-93 (“[T]he FTC is ill-equipped to handle the
responsibility . . . . The EPA is better informed and equipped to handle defining terms.”);
Cavanagh, supra note 105, at 173-74.
417. Coffee, supra note 94, at 345-46.
418. Woods, supra note 15, at 90-91.
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issue certification to private companies. The program should be designed
by the EPA in conjunction with outside experts and jointly enforced by the
EPA, the FTC, and state authorities. Part III advances the position that the
substantial rise in greenwashing and inadequate self-regulation by thirdparty private certification programs requires a new and effective system of
regulations operated by the federal government to maintain consumer confidence.
A.

Creating a Carbon Advertising Framework

In the early 1990s, lack of consumer understanding about the ozone
layer and biodegradability created a market ripe for consumer exploitation.419 Since the 1990s, consumer awareness of those terms has increased,
but the lexicon of “green” terminology continues to grow and the market
for various products containing new advertising claims is still expanding.420
Voluntary carbon offsets fall within this category.421
As demonstrated by their advertising presence and sales success, carbon
neutral products and carbon offsets have gained considerable popularity.422
However, the utter lack of regulation combined with minimal consumer
understanding of carbon offsets raises significant concerns that manufacturers will exploit the new terminology by using deceptive or misleading
claims. Although greenwashing may be commonplace in the general consumer purchasing market,423 the government can prevent the rise of deception in carbon advertising by issuing changes before consumer confidence
in carbon purchasing is severely affected.
The creation of a new regulatory framework for green marketing should
focus on balancing the interests of consumers, manufacturers, and government agencies. The goals of such regulations should be to achieve “truthful
and accurate . . . marketing,” to provide “a continuing incentive for companies to improve the environmental characteristics of their products,” to
promote “consumer confidence in environmental marketing claims,” and to
improve the regulation of deceptive or misleading claims.424
The most effective means of meeting these objectives is instituting a voluntary eco-labeling program and binding regulations for green advertising
that create uniform and specific standards. Such a program should address
the current deficiencies in the Green Guides.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-7, 246-52, 280-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
Coffee, supra note 94, at 350-51.
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Any carbon-related environmental advertising regulation will implicate
environmental policy and thus veer into the regulatory territory of the EPA.
As the FTC has repeatedly insisted, it is not the agency to devise environmental policy,425 rather, the EPA, whose mandate is to promote environmental protection, should take the lead in carbon advertising regulations.426
The most efficient means of creating a new program would be for Congress to enact legislation authorizing the EPA to both promulgate regulations for carbon environmental advertising and to devise a national ecolabeling program.427 However, even without specific congressional authorization, Massachusetts v. EPA emphasized the EPA’s responsibility to address greenhouse gas emissions;428 as a result, the EPA would have the
specific authority to create a program focusing exclusively on carbon labeling. Moreover, the EPA has significant expertise in environmental labeling programs, as evidenced by its success with Energy Star, a program implemented without any congressional authorization.429
The EPA should issue two types of carbon environmental advertising
regulation. First, it should provide scientific definitions for environmental
terminology so that manufacturers are not permitted to utilize those terms
in advertisements without complying with their definitions. Second, while
the EPA could implement a general eco-labeling program, the EPA should
devise a specific carbon eco-labeling program.
B.

A Uniform Standard for Environmental Advertising

To improve environmental advertising regulations, the EPA should issue
technical definitions, based on scientific expertise, that are commonly used
in environmental advertising. The EPA has already issued definitions and
guidelines for many of these terms.430 The EPA can use those definitions
or create definitions specifically for this program, but it must provide precise definitions for new terminology, such as “sustainable,” “renewable,”
and “carbon neutral.” The EPA can look to the Voluntary Carbon Standard
or the PAS 2050, both internationally used standards that provide definitions of key terms utilized by manufacturers.431 By creating federally

425. See supra notes 368-71 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 417-18 and accompanying text.
427. See Abidiwan-Lupo, supra note 131, at 378-79 (“If solving green advertising is the
main concern, in addition to the seal program, the government could also . . . limit the use of
‘environmentally friendly’ terms.”).
428. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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preemptive regulations based on scientific standards, the EPA program can
correct the major deficiencies in current environmental advertising regulations.432
These regulations containing definitions would be binding federal law,
which would eliminate concerns created by voluntary guidelines that merely suggest definitions. The FTC could thus no longer avoid taking action
against the voluminous number of misleading advertisements, which would
automatically constitute a federal violation. Binding regulations would also give advertisers greater notice of potential FTC action and could help
reduce misleading practices. The regulations would also decrease consumer confusion and provide consumers an opportunity to make social choices
that genuinely reward manufacturers producing goods that address carbon
emissions.433 The FTC could additionally monitor whether a company is
using national carbon seals without proper certification. By utilizing a joint
agency approach, the EPA would have a substantial role in monitoring and
enforcing regulations.
Because the eco-labeling program would be federal law, it would
preempt state environmental marketing laws and state statutory definitions,
such as those in New York and California.434 It is primarily the lack of uniformity in state regulations that has created difficulties for manufacturers.435 Advertisers would not have the same costs that are associated with
monitoring fifty independent standards,436 nor would they have the direct
costs of adapting their advertisements to each state’s regulations. In the
specific context of carbon labeling, where there are at least ten diverse certifications,437 uniformity would provide guidance to advertisers as well as
consumers.
Next, the regulations would address the Green Guides’ lack of specificity by creating clear, scientific definitions, not those based on what a scientific term “might” mean to a consumer.438 The FTC does not currently
have more specific definitions because it is concerned it would be making
environmental policy. But if the EPA were to create the definitions, it
would clearly fall within its realm of authority. One of the fundamental
concerns expressed by carbon offset industry representatives is that there is

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

See generally supra notes 308-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-20, 118, 377 and accompanying text.
See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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no clear definition of a “carbon offset.”439 The most controversial aspect of
the definition is the concept of “additionality,”440 which requires that the
carbon offset truly reduce emissions that would not have happened without
the offset credit and should be incorporated into the EPA’s definition of a
carbon offset.441 Current offsets do not guarantee that a product has met
that additionality standard or even that consumer funds will support active
projects. Creating a standard for carbon offsets that includes a requirement
of additionality will continue incentivizing consumers to make purchases
and avoid future skepticism.
Finally, the regulations administered by the EPA would correct the
Green Guides’ inadequacies of outdated terminology and lack of scientific
substantiation.442 The new standards must include definitions for more recent terminology utilized in advertising strategies, such as “carbon offsets,”
“carbon footprint,” “carbon neutral,” and “sustainability.” Once the EPA
has created the definitions, the FTC should rigorously enforce its deceptive
advertising policy in regulating advertisements containing these terms so
that regulation can be enforced from the beginning of the trend, not once it
has already caused substantial consumer confusion and deterred purchasing
decisions.
C.

A National Eco-Labeling Program: A Carbon Certification Seal

The EPA would also be responsible for establishing and issuing a carbon
certification seal that would be granted to private manufacturing companies. Because the carbon offset market is still relatively new,443 the number
of private certification programs is not nearly as expansive compared to
general environmental certification programs. Furthermore, many carbon
offset providers have called for definitions and regulations to enhance consumer confidence.444 Because a carbon certification seal would be voluntary, those opposed to the EPA’s program could simply elect not to submit
their products for certification. While eliminating other carbon certifica-

439. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
440. See Stern, supra note 386, at 5-6; David Owens, Re: Carbon Offset WorkshopComment, ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, at 2-3 (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/comments/carbonworkshop/533254-00058.pdf; Rangan, supra note 335, at
2.
441. See Randall S. Abate & Todd A. Wright, A Green Solution to Climate Change, 20
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 87, 104 (2010); see also Determining the Additionality of
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Projects, THE CLIMATE TRUST (2007), at 5-6, available at http://
www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/Climate_Trust_Additionality.pdf.
442. See supra notes 374-83 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 269, 279-83, 375-76 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 329-36 and accompanying text.
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tion seals might reduce the risk of confusion among consumers, this approach would likely be considered a ban on commercial speech and would
not be upheld by the courts.445 However, the goal of a voluntary government-sponsored carbon seal would be to create consumer awareness and
confidence that a product has met certain standards. The government could
help achieve this objective by utilizing an advertising campaign that raises
awareness of the label and touts the legitimacy of the government seal over
private certifications.
The program for a carbon certification seal should be a public-private
hybrid model that follows the procedures exhibited in the organic framework and international examples.446 First, the EPA would create a national
seal that would be applied to products indicating they have met certain criteria. Though the seal may not initially gain national recognition, over
time, like the Energy Star label and Germany’s Blue Angel logo, consumers will associate the environmental seal with the EPA and greater credibility.447 Like Blue Angel and the UK Carbon Trust program, the EPA
should create product categories that are eligible for a national carbon certification.448 To eliminate many of the delays and transaction costs, the EPA
should have the authority to directly determine product categories eligible
for the seal. While it could still seek and review public comments from
third parties, it would be too time consuming and inefficient to have a continuous back and forth between numerous panels and the EPA. To generally calculate the greenhouse gas emissions of product categories, the EPA or
a third-party agency monitored by the EPA should test products within
those categories. Because product testing is one of the most expensive
areas, the EPA has traditionally left testing to the manufacturers themselves, which has created issues in substantiating product claims. One
means of lowering costs is for the EPA to rely on the extensive product
category testing that has been conducted by Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European countries.
Once the product categories are selected, the EPA must establish a
process for testing individual products that are submitted by manufacturers
to determine if they meet the carbon seal requirements. While the EPA
could devise its own standard for calculating the carbon emissions of a
product, it could easily adopt the widely accepted Voluntary Carbon Standard or PAS 2050 standards, which calculate the greenhouse gas emissions

445.
446.
447.
448.

See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206-10, 211-28, 232-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-73, 229-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 222-24, 237-39 and accompanying text.
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of a product throughout its life cycle.449 An advisory board composed of
scientists, consumers, retailers, manufacturers, environmentalists, and carbon offset providers should be formed to determine which testing criteria
should be adopted.450 They should have an opportunity to advocate or critique either of these methods or propose an entirely new method for calculating emissions without utilizing the resources of the EPA.
The advisory board would also make comments and suggestions on
standards for determining how products in each category would be deemed
certifiable.451 Under the Blue Angel program, manufacturers submit their
own data, which creates issues of falsification because companies could
doctor information to ensure their products are eligible for the seal.452 The
UK’s Carbon Trust Footprint Company also permits companies to calculate
their own carbon footprints to determine if they meet the certification requirements.453 One solution would be for the EPA to partner with a privately operated testing facility which could either test individual products
or analyze data submitted by manufacturers to ensure its accuracy. Although individual testing may be costly, if the EPA is committed to displaying accurate carbon information, it may be necessary to at least initially
conduct such testing to demonstrate to manufacturers that deceptive information will not be tolerated. This would lend greater credibility to the carbon certification program. Based on the input of the advisory board, the
EPA would then adopt criteria for greenhouse gas calculations and testing
procedures for submitted products.
Once a product complies with the EPA criteria, the EPA would provide
the company with a certification seal to place on the product or use in
product advertising. The carbon seal would indicate to consumers that the
product has met government-established criteria and consumers could seek
out the seal to reduce confusion in their decision making. Additionally,
like the UK Carbon Trust program, the seal would indicate to consumers
that the company is making an environmentally conscious commitment to
lowering its carbon emissions.454 When “the same term[] in a similar system of presentation or format [is used] to convey information, it signals to
consumers that there is a consensus or maybe even a supervising entity in-

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207-08, 222-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207-08, 222-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 233-35, 241 and accompanying text.
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volved.”455 Thus, as the seal became more widely used, consumers would
gain greater confidence in the seal’s credibility.456
The advisory board should determine just how much information should
be contained in the carbon certification seal. It could simply provide a logo
to be placed on products or it could provide consumers with more information about the carbon footprint of a particular product. If the EPA opts to
use simply a logo, as it does with the Energy Star program, the standards
for calculating the greenhouse gas emissions should be freely available to
the public on its website. To offset some costs of the program, the EPA
should require a fee in exchange for this advertising licensing agreement.457
The final step in creating a national carbon seal is the process of certification. The United States Energy Star and Organic Foods programs both
have faced criticism that their certifications are unreliable and lack governmental oversight.458 The major problem under the OFPA is that, while
the regulations create USDA accredited agents, organic producers have the
option to select their own certifying agent.459 The Energy Star program
does not even require a certifying agent, but relies solely on the manufacturer’s claim that their product has met the criteria before being granted the
Energy Star logo.460 The result can be minimal enforcement and a downward drive toward minimum standards.
There are two proposed methods of combating the risks associated with
the certifying process. The government agency could either be chiefly responsible for the certification or the EPA could implement changes to address the risks associated with third-party certification. One proposal to reduce risk is to adopt the suggested model where manufacturers seeking
certification pay into a general fund administered by the government or a
third-party partner of the government, which then randomly assigns a certifier to a project and pays the certifier from the general fund.461 This could
potentially resolve the problem of companies self-selecting accrediting

455. Levy, supra note 21. Levy cites to the consistent style and format of nutrition fact
panels as one of the main reasons they have gained consumer confidence. Id.
456. See id.
457. See supra notes 123-24, 227-28 and accompanying text.
458. See Energy Star Has Lost Some Luster, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2008, at 24-25, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/home-garden/resource-center/energy-star-haslost-some-luster/overview/energy-star-ov.htm; Paula Lavigne, Firm Accused of Selling Regular Beans as Organic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 19 2006, at 3A (“A Texas company
that sold regular beans as organic to customers all over the nation has been cited for breaking several federal rules and could face criminal charges.”).
459. See Endres, supra note 193, at 32-33.
460. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
461. See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 197, at 888.
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agents because they are aware that particular agents have lower standards
than others for accreditation. Testing products or requiring research protocols that are independently verified could also help correct the lack of government oversight that currently exists in U.S. labeling programs.
The final component of an eco-labeling program is establishing a method of enforcement. Although the EPA should be primarily responsible
for developing the standards and evaluating a product’s criteria for certification, the FTC and state governments should play a crucial role in enforcing the regulations. States are currently responsible for enforcing laws under the Clean Air Act, and if a carbon-focused eco-labeling program was
promulgated under the Act, states could implement such changes in their
continued enforcement. The enforcement would also be more effective and
better utilize resources if it supplemented a solely federal enforcement system because the threat of both federal and state litigation could induce
greater compliance from manufacturers.
CONCLUSION
Though greenwashing is a significant obstacle to increasing consumer
understanding of environmental claims, a nationwide eco-labeling program
would reduce consumer confusion over time. Carbon labeling is an innovative way to encourage consumers, manufacturers, and government agencies to stay apprised of the latest technology and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. A carbon labeling program would provide consumers with the
information necessary to make environmentally conscious decisions and
encourage manufacturers to reduce the negative environmental impact of
the goods they produce.

